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1

INTRODUCTION

One ot the azioma by whichtra:velers i. the purviewl at hiatorical
reaearCh direot their steps to truth deolarel the unity and oontinuity
of' history.

Changes in the historio loene are gradual and are the result

ot the eondi tions and toroes of' a pre'rlous time. Hiatory ia evolution, not
revolution.

Even those uphea'ftls that we oharacterize as revolts bave had

their 1"00ta in the deep paat. '
For this reason, to the unthinking, to 'the untrained obaerver, a
oa toby 1I0gan like "The Np Deal" ia JIIi lIeading.

To the A.merioan people

oaught in the maelstrom ot depression in the early 1930' a, ready to grasp
at any

h~pe, . it

meant just what it aaid-... "new deal."

Acoompanied, as it ,

waa, by the rapid ...otio!l pace of' the firat weeks ot Franklin Rooaevelt'.
first administration, 1ta etfeot upon mrale
pragmatiotriumph.
it entailed 'Were
Americans.

]a

'ft.

_gieal; it .eemed a

In reality, the prinCiples it involved and the aotions
rgely heritages trom tormer generations of' orusading

It is the purpoae of' this thesia to oonaider one phaae at the

"New Deal", 1 t. earlielt program to r agrioul tu re J to delve into the past
and to bring baok trom ita ahadowl to stand lide by aide with eaoh "New
Deal" tarmpoliey ita reaponsible progenitor.

11

auPTER I
mE REDUCTION OF FARM SURPLUSES

When Franklin Roosevelt a_aumed the dutie. of the preB1denoy, the
entire country ftl in the throel of a deprellion.
.ufferer. were the

fa~ers;

In the foremolt line of

in fact, farom distrels fta

'0

acute that many

believed that it. alleviation had to be the hub of any reoovery

prog~.

A.ccordingly, one of the first measurea the new president inaugurated ftl a
plan to deal with thi. phase of the national economy.
'!he f1r.t agricultural bill which he .ent to Congre88 and whioh eTentually became Title I of the A.grioultural Adjustment Act .tated that ita
purpose • • ,
To e.t&bliah and maintain .uch balance
between production and consumption of agricul tunl COBlOd! tie_ and suoh marketing
condition. theretore, al will reestablish
prioes to ta1'llers at a leTel .that will giw
agrioul tural oommodi tiel a purchasing power
wi th respeot to article. that tarmers buy
equiftlent to the purchasing po~er ot agricultural commodities in the base period. 1ne
baae period in the case of all agricultural
commodities exoept tobacoo .hall br the prewar period, Augu.t 1909-July 191'.
In the course of the leventy yearl whioh elap.ed between the CiTil War
and the "New Deal," if we preclude the abnormal oondi tiona which preTailed
between 1914 and 1920, there had been only a little more than a decade
during which the American farm population al a whole enjoyed a normally

i

.

Hou.e Report 3836, 13d Cong., lIt Sels., 611
1

2

prosperous existenoe.

1bat .... s the period 1901-1913.

Those halaton year.

tom a ohapter ot agrarian history during which agricul tural

product~

ex-

ohanged tor indu.trial product. and services on a plane ot comparative
stabili ty and they were in direct oontrast to · the fifty odd yearl during
whioh the perennial problem ot the American tarmer was the price diBpari ty
between what he sold and what he bought.

One of the most signifioant

causes ot this .pread between agricultural income and expense ..... an ever
increasing over-produotion. 2
Surplusea, in the tirst instance, were the result ot too great an
expanlion ot agrarian areal •

.lfter the Civil War, herican capitalism re-

lied upon toreign financial au1atanoe.

.lgrioul tural inorementl

we~

a

meana ot balanoing international payment. and, as a conaequence, Eastern
induatrialists and po 11 ticianB did everything in their power to expand the
operationl ot American agriculture.

They lucceeded to the extent that in

the three decade. tollowing 1810 more land wa •• ettled than in all our
preceding history. 3 .lt the lame tiJae, re'VOlution in tranaportation during
the latter half ot the century was enabling Russia, India, .lustralia,

2It

.

is important to detine the term "oTer-production." Charles Beard and
George H. E. Smith in The Old Deal and the New, lIacmillan, N. Y., 194:0, 177,
accurately ltate. "OTerproduot'i'O'ili.e: relatiVe term. It doe. not mean 1tat
the tar.mer produoed more than the American people or people abroad oould
consume. While it 11 true that tood produotion i. limited by the capacity
ot the atomaoh, that oapaoi ty hal never been reaohed in herioa wi th its
millions ot undernouriahed •••• the fanner lives and works in a money sYltea
where _rketl depend not alone upon needB or deair.a, but al.o upon the
ability to pay tor what i. produoed. It ilin this .enae that the tanDer
hal been turning out more goodlthan the A.merioan people oould buy or tore
markets could take at prices suffioient to pay the cost ot production."

~

Thirteenth Census ot

.!!! Un! ted

State., Washington, 1913, V, 51, 67.

Algeria, CaDada, Vexico, and Argentina to enter the world marketl.· In
spite ot thi., the 1890', law a reviTal ot Malthusianilm and this tear ot
tailing tood supplies gaTe rise to the conserY&tion mDTement, irrigation
projectl, and baok-to-th.-land crulade. of Theodore Roo.eTelt and Howard
FiDally, the preaaing deanda ot cur Alli •• and ot our own people

Taft.

during World War I resulted in adding nearly 50,000,000 acres ot land to
that already under cultivation.
While acreage ..... thul augmented, produotion effioienoy . a also inoreasing a. a re.ul t ot improTed crop .train., the application of tertilizer,
and mechanization Which 'imultaneously released land. torm.rly planted in
teed crope to other u.es and inoreased the aTerage output per agricultural
worker.

The probl_ ot eurpluee. was further complicated by a statiODary

it not deol1Ding population tog.ther With ohanging habits ot tood and drell.
P.ople con.umed more augar, .tIt, and truita, l.a. cereale, m.at, and
potatoe.) they wore 1 ••• wool and cotton) taTored, inst.ad, .ilk and rayon.
1'be oore of the turplue problem, esp.oially atter World War I, _. the
ark.t--domeatio and toreign.

At hoae, the purohasing power ot the great

bulk of the Amerioan people was aotually T.ry JIl.agr..

In 1929, which waa

oonsider.d a pro,peroua year, the national inoome reaohed eighty-one billion
dollar., but "42 pero.nt ot [Aaerican] taudli •• had l.as than $1500 annual
inoom.

or about $30 per .....k and 60 p.rcent bad 1 ... than $2000 [per

annum or] about .40 p.r w•• k.,,4
1920'a.

Th. toreign JU.rk.t .... s wreok.d in the

During the First World War, w. had paid our d.btl and b.com. a

or.d! tor nation.

Thereaft.r, we railed taritf ....11. against ilIlports whiob

'Beard and Smith, 182.

1.-.--------------~
4

made it impossible tor toreign countries to pro'9ide an exchange ta-r our
Many nations, too, mindtul ot the lessons ot the

agricul tural exports.

war, embarked upon a program ot selt-sutticiency and let up oontroll which
progressi vely out down 'WOrld markets.

The competition tor such markets as

did remain .... s strenuous because American capital invested in Canada,
Mexico, South America, Atrica, Australia, and the Far East . . de it poesible
tor these countries to turther increase their exportations.
To aocomplish the purpose set torth in the Agricultural Adjustment .lot
it was obviously necessary that the RooseTelt admkdstration pro'9ide a mean.
ei ther to eliminate these surpluses or to utili •• them..
ad'9isers employed both. methods.
proposed were not
.0

radical.

.0

Roosevelt and hi.

Contrary to their boaat, the de'rioes the,.

new, nor, as their critic. liked to repeat, were they

The aoquili tion ot new toreign market. wa. part ot their plan

but this, even to the character and parposea ot their trade agreement., had
been tried betore.

Their program alao called tor the control ot d1stribu- .

tion and production through. tarmer-government cooperation.
a past.

'l'hi., too, had

Government had long cooperated with the tarmer to de'Velop a pro-

duotion SCience, and, betore World Ws.r I, imp.tu. toward a .. . rketing .cience
had been gi'Ven.

Atter the ..... r, tarm. leader. in and out ot gOTernment

circles .aw that a synthesis ot the two techniques would be neces.ary and
attem.pted to realize it.

The demcoratio planners ot 1933 but gave concrete

torm to the 'rision. that the.e picneers had dreamed--RooseTelt'. "new deal"
tor agriculture ..... simply the logical crystallilation and culmination ot
the thinking, legislation, and practice Which had been tocused on this
problem tor many year••

5

That .. quest tor foreign _rkets would be an integral part of·the "New
Deal" policy to reduce far.m surpluses was clearly foreoast by Governor
Roosevelt in hi. oampaign address at Topeka, Kansas, on September 14, 1932.
Speaking ot :r:eciproca1 tari,t t bargaining, he said, "An effeoti Te application
of this principle will restore the flow of international trade; and the
first result of that flow will be to assist substantially the Amerioan
far.mer in disposing of his surplus."5 After the "New Dealers" were actually
in the seats of government, thi.s polioy was reaffirmed by Cordell Hull, then
Secretary of State, in an address betore the American Far.m Bureau Federation,
Deoember 10, 1934, at Nashville. Be deolared, "In the present low state ot
agricul tural prioes and of world trade, it ia espeoially important to develop
foreign trade, for foreign markets alone oan take all our agricultural
surplus."S
The Trade Agreement Aot, approved June 12, 1934, provided for reoiprooity through ExeoutiTe agreements.

.

and former uaage is easily established.

The accord between this arrangement
Neither the principle nor its

application to farm distress was peouliar to the "New Deal."
The early reoord of the United States in respect to reoiprooity i. not
impressi Te btlt sentiment for it existed from about 1844.

In that year,

return in kind with the German Zollverein was proJ?O&ed but rejected by the
5The Genesis of the New Deal, 1928-1932, (The Public Papers and Addresses
~Fn.nklin i5':" ROOsevelt, 5 vOI'8.", ed. bySa'mue1 I. Rosenman, Random House,

r. Y.,

S

1938)7 I. 702.

Cordell Bull, Agrioulture and Forei~n-Trade Agreements, State Department
Publioation No. 678, Washington, 19 5, 16.

6

.

Senat..

7

Bow....r. from that time to the pre.ent. thi8 principl. has be.n

rep.atedly lugg.st.cl and 8inoe 1890 reoiprocal tariff bargaining by .x.outiv. agreement has be.n the privilege of various pr •• id.nt •• 8
j,t l.ast that .arly, too, r.oiprocity was cono.i... d
.yphoning off farm .urplul.s.

a~

a method of

On July 11, 1890, ...hen Senate d.bat. on the

Kolinl.y bill ..... ima1nent, Blain. wrote to Mr.f'r1e ot Kain., "R.r. i8 an
opportunity..me... the farmer may b. ben.fited"'!-pri_rily, undeniabl"
riohly ben.fited.

B.r. i8 an opportunity for a Republioan Oongr.s. to opeD

the mark.ts of torty millions ' of p.opl. to the produots of ~rioan tarms."g
Senator V.st stated un.quivocally that Blaine oonsid.r.d South

~rioan

markets "a r.liet for the ••• d.pr.ssion of agrioultural int.reata."iO

In

1902 [1] Wil11 . . F. ICing, one of the founders of the )lerchants usooiation

----

of ..... York, in an artiol. for the V .... York 1'1me., wrote, "Let U8 go turth.r
in the way of r.oiprocity •••• In all linea of food produot' this oountl")' has
a surplul.",ll

'''Tariff Bargaining Uncler Most-Favor.d-Nation Agre.MI1ta," S.nate Doc\1Dll8J1t 7,
7Sd Oong.,lst S.IS., 11-1&. Reoiprocity until 1890 inolua.a navigation
qu.stions al ....11 ~I tariff rat.s. S••• U. S. Tariff Oommis.ion,R.ciprocity ~ Co_rcial Tr.ati.s, Washington, 1919, 150.
-

~ous. R.port ~, 73d Cong., 2nd S.8 •• , 9-10.
9Edward Stan:.ood, aerioan Tariff Oontrov.rBi•• in the JUn.t.enth O.ntury,
BoughtOn, lI1fflin ad Co., I. y., 1904, II, 218:-lOcongr.SSic••l>RtJoGrd.. 518t Cong., l.t S.... , 7905 ,
11
William F. ICing, !ntemati onal ubitratlon
1902 [11 15.

~

R.ciprooity, (no publish.r),

p-.....--------------------------~
7

AI a tara reliet . .asure. reoiprooity .... s unneoessary in the .itirat two
deo..des of thiB oentury.

!he period 1901-1913. aa haa .been noted. was one

ot agrioultur.. l proaperity cd during World War I there were no tara eurplu....

But .. tter the n.r. the eoonomio n ..tionalisJll ot the 1920'. r.sulted

in hug. orop oarry-ov.r..

While the e:d genoie. that toat.r.d it _r. not

solely ..gr..riCl in natur •• still oonoern tor agrioultur ..l alIenation .....
in part r.sponsible tor the gradual aovement t01l8l"d reoiprooal reduotion

taritfs whioh .. gain developed.

ot

For example. the .Amerioan Exporter. and

Import.rs Aasooi&tion and the F..ir Taritf Le ..gue both adTooated oorrelatiTe
tariffa as tara .....ure •• 12
Thi. short history makes it obvious that the ....11' De .. lers-: did nothing

very radical in r.gard to types _d PlU"Pos.s ot taritt oontraots and it i.
also po •• ibl. to show that the proviSions of th.ir trade legislation were
drawn in th.ir .88enoe trom the past.

Aa a matter ot faot. the Roosevelt

'"
admini.tration did not pus an entir.ly new bill. for the Trad. Agr.eact
,.,.
.A.ot ..... aiJllply an ....ntU.nt to the Hawley-Smoot Taritt ot 1930. whioh in
turn olosely r •••mb~ed the Fordn.y-JIoOuaber Taritt or 1922.
!'his ...ndment .nabl.d the prea1dent to

~

reciprocal agr.e.nts on

speoified articl.s within a rang. of 50 p.roent aboT. or below the Unit.d

...

S~at ••

0D8

tariff l.wl.

Flrtbarmore ••quivalent conoe.aion. altered into with

nation were to .xtend g.nerally to all nation..

Lik. rat•• were to be

appli.d to those countries baving unoonditional aost-raTored-natiClD
treatlMllt. and those having no treaties or agreement. at all.unl.ss. p.rchance. any ot these di.oriminated against the United Statel.

8

These condi tiona were rooted deep in the philosophy of formet tariff
laws.

Consider the seotions oonoerned with non-disorimination.

Aooording

to John Day Larkin who made a study ot oertain phase. ot Amerioan tariff
history. the state Department explained that these seotions provided that
the duties proolaimed in oonsequenoe of the trade agreements entered into
with foreign oountries would be extended to all oountries but that they
oould be oonfined to suoh oountriea a8 did not disoriminate again8t A.merioan
oommeroe or pur8ue polioies whioh tended to defeat the purpose of the Aot. 1S
111i8 Ileana that the high tax

ot the general, or Hawley-Smoot Taritf. oould

be oontinued against a partioular country rather than a generalization ot
rates negotiated in oontingent agreements.

!bU8 the Aot ot 1934 attempted

to reoonoile our poat-war unoondi tional interpretation ot DIOst-tavored-

nation treatment

14
and the .pirit ot the penalty olauses of the MoKinley and

Dingley Taritts which authorized the president to suspend reoiprooal rates
whenever he determined that unequal treatment ..... being accorded the United
I1'1 the sense ot being a penalty. it i. eTen sUghtly reminiscent

States .15

ot seotions 317 and 338 of the Fordney-McCumber and Hawley-SJIlOot Taritts,
respeotiTely, whioh gaTe the president authority to penalize With additional
duties or even exolusion suoh nations as disoriminated against the United
Statea. 16

13 John Day Larkin, The President.. Contro 1 of the Tariff, Harvard Uni versi ty
Press, Cambridge,"1li'u., 19S~, 54, oltingstate Department prell release
ot April 5. 1935.
14genry J. Taloa, ~ Reciprooal Trade Policy ot the United Stat•• ,
University ot Pennsyl~nia Press, PhiladelphIa,-,u938, 116-111.
15

E?!!.,

&0.

16
U. S. Taritf

CO~B8ion,

148, 201.

9

!be power given the preaident to inorease or decrease

exiati~

rates by

50 percent resembled both the praotioe ' of maximum and minimum rates adopted
in 1909 and the presidentially-oontrolled flexible tariff adjustment WTitten
into the Fordney-McCwaber and Hawley-Smoot Tariff..

The former set two

sohedulel of duties either of Whioh the presldentoou1d employ as the inter17
'
eat of the country delanded, the latter permitted the president to adjust
ratea to equalize the cost of produotion between foreign and domestio
artiolel. 18
Originality oould not 'e?en be oonceded the ohief critioism le?eled
, against the Trade Agreement Aot.

Beoause oompaota under the bill were not

subject to oongressional approval, opponents renTed the old oontention
that , the bill delegated legislative power to the president. 19

The majority

report of the House waya and Means Committee to which the bill was first
referred aimed a lengthy rebuttal at thi. pod tion.
early as 1794. when many ot the

t~er.

It showed that "aa

of the Constitution were Itill

actiTe in publio aftair., Congress pasled an act delegating to the president
the powera not merely to regulate or to fix rate. affeoting oommerce but
.ctually to prevent altogether the exportation of goods from the United
Statel.,,20

The report traoed the recurrence of this procedure throughout

our hiltory and emphasized the faot that under seotion 4228 of the ReTiled
Statute. preTioul exeoutiTe trade agreementl

had not been lubmitted to

l7Ibid •• 269-270
l8Ibid •
19co~ressiona1 Reoord. 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 7119; 7Sd Cong., 2d Sesl ••
52 0,,_ 6364; taurep.oe J. Laughlin and H. Parker Willil, Reoiproci ty,
The ,z,alceF 'a na Taylo r Co.. N. Y.. 1903, 207.
2'\iouse Report 1000, 7.

10
Congress and their oon.titutionality had been upheld by the SupreJe Court
more than onoe. 21
The real heart of the Roosevelt surplus program was the dual system of
oooperative produotion and IDarket control--a system no more unique in its
broad oonoeption and in its detAiled parts than "New Deal" tariff legil1ation has been shown to be.

Produotion control as employed by the "New Deal"

was litted bodily from a syst . . of thought whioh had been developing tor at
least ten years.

It

1I8.S

indigenous to the eoonomio nationalism of" the time

tor it adTooated a produotion .treamlined to the needs of home _rots.

As

an emergenoy mealure it oould concei,.bly be disoarded it trade agreements
and research in agrioul tural by-produots _de it teasi ble.

On the other

hand, it could beoome a permanent adjunot of the national lite.
As worked out by the "New Deal", produotion adjustment applied to the
"ba.io" oommoditie., wheat, cotton, corn, hogs, rioe, tobaoco, milk and its
produots.

On acoount of the wide di vergenoy in method. of hu.bandry, de-

tAils of the projeot varied with the product affected.

But, presoinding

from the milk industry, the peculiar nature and oonditione of whioh required
at tirst a "trial and error" method,22tundamental provisions were these.
aocording to his oWn diaoretion, the Seoretary of Agriculture oould "lease
land in large areas •••• and retire it from the production ot any crop"; or,

21!!!!.,

12, 14.

22Agrioul tunl Adjustment,

! Report 2.! ~ Adminlltration ~
Adjustment Act, May, 1933 ~ February, 1934, U. S. Gov't.
Offioe, Washington, 1934,153.

~

Agricultural
Printing

11

he could oontract with individual farmers to reduce their output

~y

a cer-

tain percentage calculated on a base period of the three or tour preceding
years.

In return, rental payments or reduction beneti tl were gi Ten to the

contracting partie •• 23

Since the producer performed his part when he took

Itepl to ourtail output, he received the payment. eTen it hil crop tailed.
Thus he enjoyed what amounted to crop insurance.

The funds tor these .ub-

sidies were deriTed from the imposition ot a tax on the processor ot the
eDamerated products.

Together with the price rise acoomplilhed through

crop reduction. these remunePationa were intended to give the
equi ty in .purchasing power which 118.8 the purpose ot the plan.

ta~er

the

To avoid

otfending against democratic processe8, complianoe with the plan was made
vo luntary •
Allotment was not a new device when the "New Deal" introduced it.

It

had been used rather succel.tully in England, Australia, and Brazil. 24and
variation. ot it had been discussed or tried here in this country for some
years.
The belief that areduoed output 118.8 the answer to farm surplusel began
to tind expre.lion rather generally loon atter we found our.elTes

~th

a

war-expanded producing plant and contracted world market.; in other word.,
early in the '20'..

For the JIIOst part, however, those who wrote or lpoke

on the .ubject telt that this must be aooomplished through the education of
the indi"t'idual farmer who would then voluntarily and in "solitary .plendor"
23W1hon Gee, Amerioan Farm Policy, W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1934,
53; Archibald ii. Woodiii?1, Farm. Mortlage Loana ~!!!!! Insuranoe Companies,
Yale University Press, NewHaT8n, 19 7, 127, 128.
24woodrutf, 128-129, n. 6; Edwin R. A. Seligman. The Economic. ot Fara
Relief, Columbia University Preu, N. Y., 1929, 2:59.
--

~------------------~
12
reduoe his aoreage or, at least, his output.

These expressions o! opinion

emanated largely trom the professorial and offioial ranks.
For instanoe, in January, 1922, President Harding, addressing the
National Agrioultural Conterenoe whioh he had summoned, said, -With proper
finanoial support tor agrioulture and with inatrwnentalities tor the 001leotion and dissemination of useful information, a group ot cooperative
marketing organizations would be able to advise their members as to the
probable demand for staples, and to propose measures for proper limitation
of acreages in particular oropa."25

The report of the Seoretary of

Agrioulture tor the year 1923 advised the reduotion of acreage "since
acreage was largely inoreased to meet war demands, and •••we now have a
surplus."

26

Herbert Hoover, then Seoretary ot Commeroe, said in 1924,

"continuanoy ot overproduotion means surplus and that can only be oorreoted
by prices low enough to make production unprofitable tor some of the acreage
of use."27

In 1927, Seoretary of Agrioulture Jardine, writing in the

Oklahoma Stookman

~

Farmer, warned farmers that as surpluses from normal

yields piled up, they must reduce their acreage. 28

Finally, a third Seore-

tary of Agrioulture, Arthur Hyde, writing in 1'he American Yearbook for
1930 stateda ·
25aee , 28, citing Report of ~ National Agrioultural Conference, January
23-27, 1922, U. S. Gov'tPrinting Offioe, Washington, 1922, 6-13.
26
"The Wheat Situation," Agrioulture Yearbook, 1923, 15.
27 Genesis 2! ~!!!! Deal, 707.
28
John D. Black, Agrioultural Reform in the United states, First Edition.
MoGraw~I1l1 Book Co., I. Y., 1929,

n.-

13
By this time it is evident that supply·
and-demand conditions cannot be let alide by
legislation, that the damping ot aurplUles
abroad is not teasible, that the indetim te
storing ot surpluses tends to prevent rather
than cause a rise in prices. that tariff
duties are notet:tective on commodities produoed largely for export, and that suba1diea
would inorease rather than restrain produotion.
Voluntary ourtailment of produotion is the only
10gioal remedy tor the surplus problem. 29

•

Among leading profeasors who lubscribed to this reasoning wereW. E. Grimes,

head of the Department of Agriou1tural Economics of Kansas State Agricu1ttnl.
College and JOlelh Stagg Lawrence, profesaor ot economics at Prinoeton. 30
The period covered by these statements

1nLS

one of RepUblioan ascendanoy

and the Republioans did inaugurate an intormation sem" regarding production, the so-aalled "Outlook

Reportl~·

These were careful surveys, made by

the Department of Agrioul tun. of the probable acreage required, With normal
yields, to meet market demands at fairly satistactory prices.

They were

published late in January and a few weeki later the Department sent out its
"Intentions Report,· whioh indicated the inoreases or decreases in crop
aoreage contemplated by tarmers.

The first ot theae report. appeared in

the spring of 1923. 31
29
Arthur M. Hyde, "Agricul ture and Allied Industrtea,· The American Yearbook, A Record ot Events and Progress, Year 1930, (ed. by Albert BUShnell
rart, '!he herican YearbO~Corporation;-2l9Teit 43rd St., N. Y., 1931,
374-388.
3Ow. E. Grimea, "Diveraitioation ot Agriculture--Its ~tation. and Its
Ad'98.ntages," The Annab ot the American Aoademy ot Fbll tioal and Social
Soience, (ed.by Ci,de L:-Klng, Tile Gerioan Academr ot FbUtI'O'al and
Sooial Scienoe, Philadelphia, 1929, 216-221), CXLII, 220,Joseph Stagg
Lawrence, "The Futility ot Farm Relief, n Harper's Monthlz Magadne, Harper
and Brothers, N. Y., Deoember, 1929-May, 1930, 686-695, cLX, 692.
3lSeoretary's Report, Agrioul tunl Yearbook,

.!!!!'
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There are 'Yariou. rea.ona, how~ver, why such unorganized redu<ftlon
could not but fail.

POlllbly, the most pointed are that the farmer.'

chargee are mainly tilted ohargee. whioh do not vary with the volume of

~ro-

duetion, and that each farmer, oonvinoed that hi' un! t of output i. an
insignificant part of the Whole, feel. he is better off producing, even at
low pricel. than letting part or all of hia plant lie idle. 32
The Replbl1cana flnallY ,seemed to realize this for on Dec_ber 7, 3.932,
the Federal Farm Board in "special report reoommended that pronsion be
made for

It

an effeotive

8yst~

for regulating aoreage ••• ,,33

A number of allptment plans were bruited about the oountrr~t the
one the "New Deal" adopted .... a. in itl first form, worked out lometime 1:18fore 1926 by Dr. W. J. Spillman, an eoonomiet in the -Department of Agrieulture under Coolidge.

While it is not pol8lble to state that it .... s hil

inspiration, still it is

p~bable

that in the course of hie work, Dr.

Spillman became familiar With the allotment plan adopted by the Maryland
State Milk Producers Au().oiation in 1923.
theirs in prinoiple.

Certainl y, his plan resembled

The Maryland plan divided the milk supply into "bIUio"

..nd "surplus" quanti ties.

'!he "basio" portion

'WaS

that sold .to oonaumera

al fluid milk, the "Iurplus' oomprised .. 11 milk reoeipts above the "baa 1. c"
quantity.

Sinoe "b.. llo" milk .~pplied the entire demand, it brought ..

higher prioe than the "surplus" whioh

W8.S

.old for whatever price it would

32

Austin A. Dowell and Ole .. r B. Jelnell, The American Farmer and the Export
Market, University of Minnesota Preu, iUnne.. polii. 1934,

5:---

33 Gee • 44.

34John D Bl....ok, "Plana For Raid
Prioes of Farm Products by Government
Aotlon.t, (The Almals of the Am.e~can Academy of Political and Sooial
SOience, er.Dy ciyde'L.-rrng. PfiIl.. deiPhia, rg2~ CitIl, ~-!90.
)
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bring in daig' product usel.

Allotment. of "basid' milk were i88ued to in-

diTidual producer. in amount. equal to their average monthly produotion in
. Ootober, November, and Deoember from 1921 to 1923.

If a member lold his

herd, the allotment went to the new owner. 35
Dr. SpillDLnt. sJitem would have permitted a fanner

~

produoe all he

wished 01' a given oommodity but any amount in excess 01' a oertain allotment,
baaed on hi. average for several

year~,

must be sold at prevailing pricea.

)

This allotment, whioh would be tigur.d in bushelB, or like measurement,
rather than aoreage, wouiLd be made to the farm, not the farmer, and 1ft)uld
be _old at a tariff protected prioe.

The plan would be put into operation

by a "commi.asion of able men, II which would have power to lioense and bond
all dealerl in a proteoted commodity.

These middlemen would putchase

debenture. equal to the tariff trom the commi.sion or it. looal agent, pas_
them on, in 8uffioient amount. to oover a aale, to the produoer, Who, in
turn, would 8end them to the oommiuion a8 a reoeipt for the amount 01'
tariff due on hil allotment.
he

'ftS

It a tarmert I crop failed who 11y or partially,

limply untortunate for "The publiC ahould not be expeoted to pay him.

a tariff on something he does not produce. II36 It is easy to see here the
outline8 of the "New Deal" allotment plan touched up With McNary-Haughenism.
~e

next advance was the work of Dr. John
D. Black, an economist 01'
,

Harvard, Who modified the Spillman plan in some important particular••
Dr. Black stipulated that allotment rightl cO'qld be lold to provide a torm
35Blaok, Agricultural

Refo~.!:! ~United Statel, 300. '

3~. J. Spillman, Balancing ~.!!!!! Output, Orange Judd Publishing Co.,
N. Y., 1927, 84-99, pas8im.

~.
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of insurance.

He further provided that prooenorl would buy up al-lotaent

rightl al prodUoe ..... s turned into the market. by growers and show these
right. tor all processed articles sold domestically.

This was an improve-

ment over the Spillman plan because procesaors alone rather than all amall
buying agencies would need supervision. S1
Both the Spillman and Black plana. it il obvious. imposed a charge on
the procellor equivalent to the "New Deal" prooelsing tax.

Another plan

known aa the "Salel Tax Plan" otfers even a ololer parallel.
devised at least as early as 1929.

It had been

Thil plan would have had the prooellor

pay a tax tor all productl lold in the domeltic market and trom the funds
thua collected the produoer would reeein a bonus at the end ot the year.
either on all of the product tor which he could Ihow a salea reoeipt or on
the baail ot allotment rights. S8
Dr. Bla ok ..... s. apparently. the first to introduce the idea ot allotment to Congre.1 tor Senator Belson ot Mis.ouri. a member ot the Hous.
Committe. on

A~rioulture.

during a debate on tarm r.liet told 'the Hou.e.

"Baok in April. 1929. Dr. ·John D. Blaok. eminent economist ot Harvard, came
betore our committee and tor the first time, aa far as I know, mentioned
the so-called far.m allotment plan."39

But as the depression advanced.

varioul groups presented billl to Congress tor oonsideration--all with the
lame basic idea.

31Black,

On lay 4. 1932. John Simpson. president ot the National

Agricul tunl Refo nil

~ ~

Un! ted St& tes, 271.

38Blaok, ·Plans tor Raising the Prices of Far.m Produotl in the United
Statea." 383.
S9Congresiional Reoord, 72nd Cong •• 2nd Ses8 •• 1366.

~.
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Farmer's Union, ottered one on behalt ot three greattarm organizttions,
which would permit the Fann Board to use, optionally, the equalization tee,
the debenture plan, or allotment. 40
On

May 25, 1932, Prote88or M. L. Wilson, head ot the Department ot

Agricultural Economics ot Montana State College at Bozeman, appeared betore
the Senate Committee on Agri'Oulture to support allotment. He and Dr.
Mordecai Ezekiel, a tormer member ot the Dividon otFarm Management - ot the
Bureau ot Agricultural Economics in the Department ot Agriculture had
worked on an adaptation ot the Spillman-Black idea 41 and, according to
Representative Truax ot Ohio, it was their proposal trom which the Roolevelt
adminiatration's tarm bill eventually evolved. 42
While a copy ot Mr. Wilson's plan is not available, it is probable
that it was the same that Senator Norbeok asked to have inserted in the
Congressional Record on the same day Mr. JallOD appeared betore the Senate
Comnittee.

This plan had been presented to members ot the Senate and House

by W. R. Ronald, publisher ot the Mitchell (South Dakota] Evening Republic,

but it was the work ot a coDlllittee ot whioh Protesaor Wilson _s chairman
and it contained several provisions which appeared later in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act.

Among these were the drawbaok ot the tax on all exports ot

processed commodities, the detinition ot "basic" products, crop inaurance,
and an adjustable tax. 43

40
Ibid., 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 11144-5; Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The
~ident, Congress, and Legislation, Columbia University Press,-W: Y.,
194:6, 253.
41
COngressional Record, 73d Congo, 1st Ses8e, 1362; Chamberlain, 253.
42Ibid.
43Congreuional Reoord, 72d Cong., 1st Sell., 11144-5.
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Meanwhile, the future President Roosevelt was preparing himself to
oapture the Demooratio nomination and to win the campaign of 1932. He had
oollected his famous "Brain Trust" and, according to Ernest K. Lindley,
"Brain Truster" Rexford G. lUgwell first oalled Mr. Boosevelt's attention
to allotment sohemes for farm relief.

While allotment was in advanoe of

Roosevelt's own work as Governor of New York State, it was in line with hit
liberal ideas on the subjeot.

Consequently, about ten days before the

Demooratio National Conventi'on, Tugwell . was sent to Chioago to attend a
meeting of agricultural eoonomists who were to diloul8 a.llotment. He was

to "explore the plan and determine if it met with general approval."
Professor Wilson was present at the conference and when Tugwell returned
to Albany, he took the Professor along to explain his plan to Governor
Roosevelt. 44 Mr. lUgwell himself 'vouohes for the faot that it was in this
manner that allotment became a "New Deal" tenet. 45
That fall, shortly after
the House again held hearings.

~~e

election, the Agrioultural Committee of

This time they were oonsidering a bill

drafted by Frederio P. Lee, the 'pokesman for the National Grange, the
National Farmer's Union, and the Amerioan Farm Bureau Federation, and Allan
H. Perley, Legislative Counsel for the House.

It was called the Agrioul-

tural Adjustment Act and had been framed at a conference oalled by
President-elect Roosevelt. Henry Morgenthau, Chaiman of the Advisory
Committee on Agrioulture in New York State, and Rex Tugwell attended as

4~rnest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution, The Viking Press, N. Y.,
1933, 27-28.
45
Correspondenoe.

See Appendix I.
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Mr. Roosevelt'. representatives.

The bill waa all but identioal

~th

the

Agrioul tural Adjustment Act whioh beoame law in the next aeasion of Congreaa
At this time, however, a Senate and House hostile to eaoh other prevented
deoisiTe aotion and Congreu adjourn.d without paaaing a farm meaaure.
Thil rath.rd.tail.d acoount mak.1 it Belf-.vid.nt that the "New Deal"
polioy of allotment

'Was

the CUlmination of long disounion and planning by

both farm and governmental agenoi.a.

It was r.ally not "new."

Integrated with other plana for removal of surplul.s waa a d.tini t.
conservation program.

The hiatory of oonservation in this oountry is so

well known that its ti.s with the past need not be proved; it is of interest
only to show that the "New neal" used it to curb exoessi ve production and
that this plan

1I'&S

not original with the "New Deal."

Chester A. Davis, Administrator of the AAA, said in 1934:
Permanent removal of lub-.rginal lands from
crop production will be part of a long-time
effort ••• This means planning for better use and
oonservation of the nation's loil resources.
Submarginal land. which now are poverty farms
can be gradually removed from Ivup1us produotion
and be put into us. as forests, parks. gam.
refuge., and preserves •••• Th. enlightened policy
now being followed make. it possible for farmers
to conserve soil reaourc.s by k.eping lands out
of usel.ss oultivation to surplus crops, and by
planti~ 10il-bUilding and erosion-preventing
cover. 4

w.

can trace such vision back at least to 1926 or 1927.

Dr. Spillman

at that tim. suggested that "Some of the land now in the major crops might
perhaps be planted in perma.nent forests •••• ,,47
4aChest.r A.Davis.
47
Spillman, 45.

Presid.nt Hoov.r gave asonaof

~.!!!! 2!.. ~ ~J The Record Reviend, Wash., 1934, 7.

~..
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his reason. for desiring a Federal Farm Board. the neoessity of

~ng

an

organization authorized to remove "unprofitable marginal 1& nds" trom production. 48

This was on April 16, 1929. at least tour years before the "New

Deal" oame on the Amerioan soene.
A production oontrol program was. of oourse. lubjeot to the aotion of
natural foroes beyond human oalculation and manipulation; allo. it did not
insure the dispersion ot commodities to points ot demand.
system of market oontrols was -planned.

Consequently. a

n,.ree devioes were employed to en-

lure an orderly teeding of OODmodi ties to the market in volumes equal to
the demand.

They,;weres tirst, the purchase and holding ot lurplus quantitiea

of produoe; seoond, loans to produoers to enable them to hold over their own
surpluses; third. agreements with lioensed prooessors and distributors ot
commodities.
Surplus oODlnodi ties were at first bought up by the Agrioul tural Adjustment Administration and the Federal Emergenoy Reliet Administration with
funds made available by Congress.

For greater efficienoy in distributing

these supplies the Federal Surplus Reliet Corporation, a part ot FERA. was
organized aa a non-profit, no stook oorporation, on Ootober 4, 1933. 49
this guise it

~I

In

primarily a relietagenoy to utilize prioe-depressing

agrioultura1 surpluses tor distribution to tamilies with subnormal oonaumption.

But on November 18, 1935, it. name was ohanged to Federal Surplus

Commodi ties Corporation and its aoU vi ties transterred to the Department of
48Ray Layman Wilbur and Arthur Mastick Hyde. The Hoover Polioies, Charles
Scribner Son., N. Y., 1937, 160. citing Sta~~p.rs, I, Sl-32.
49

Genesi s

~ ~ !!!~,

263.
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Agrioulture.

From that time, emphasis was on the removal of agrio111tural

surpluses and the enoouragement of domestic oonsumption.

The commodities

it oontrolled were prooured through direot purchase with its own funds under
competitive contracts, through donations trom the AAA, and through oontributtons from State Emergency Relief Administrations whenever surplu.es
ooourred in the regions they served. 50

In oases 'Where the govel"Wllllnt la oked

adequate tacilities tor storage, non-perishable commodities, atter government inspeotion and under government .eal,

~ould

be stored by the tar.mer.

them.sel vea. 51
Some attempt was made to divert part ot these ItoCka to toreign markets
but such a plan was not generally tollowed ·beoause the Admlniltration teared
that reoiprOoAl trade paota might be imperiled it we Ihipped large volumes
abroa~

at world pricel and paid subsidies, as we must under those oonditia.,

to exporters.

However, wheat in the Paoitio Northwest was bought at domel-

tio prioe8 by local organizations and sold at world prioes with the under- .
standing that the government would reimburse their 108es. 52
Surplus cotton had it. own · ho lding agenoy, the Cotton Pool.

1'hi s

0

r-

ganization took over the cotton aoquired tor the gover.ament by the Federal
50
Report

.
the Federal SUrplU8 COlIInodi ties Coz,poration!2!:.
~~. 'Tashington, 1936, 1-4 I!uim.

2.!.

~

Calendar

5lFa r.m Reliet ~ Agricultural AdjustJaent ~, .shington, 1938, 22.
52
Farm Polioies Under the New~, (Publio Altairs Pamphlets, .!2-. 16,
~io Aftairs Committee:-rno., 8 West 40th St., N. Y., 1938), l~
Lawrenoe F. Sohmeokebier, !!! Federal Organizations, !.! Outline ot Their
Struoture and Functions, The Brookingl Institution, Washington, I934,

92,

n~

8. -
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Fa~

Board tpd added new purchases with tunds supplied by the Commodities

Credit Corporation. 53
This latter instrument attorded the seoond means ot market adju8tment.
It was set up by exeoutive order on October 16, 1933 and inoorporated under
the laws ot Delaware. According to President Roosevelt, "The object was to
contribute to the support ot tarm prices by enabling producers to hold on
to their products which might otherwise have been dumped with resulting
price deoline."54 As has been indicated, loans tor this purpose were made
to gO"f'ernment agencies, but in addition both public and private lending
organizations were enabled to enter the program under a guarantee by the
Corporation to purchase ta~er'8 notes on demand. 55
The tinal method ot market regulation exeroised by the Roose"f'elt administration was the adoption ot agreements to cover the distribution ot all
agricultural produots and competing oommodities. 56

These were "f'oluntary

contracts between the Secretary ot Agrioulture and the prooes.ors and the
middle men who handled such commoditie8; they were exempt trom anti-tru.t
law8, and could regulate trade praotioes, prices, and the volume coming to
market.

This last function was accomplished through the

te~

ot the oom-

paots which limited the sale. ot the commodity to top grade or grades,
suspended shipment. when markets were glutted, or rationed the market
53woOdrutt, 128, n. 5.
5'Genesis ~ ~ !!!~, 407.
55rbid.
56
For example jute and paper oompeted with ootton bags.
Pamphlets, No. 16, 8.

Publio Attairs
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amongst shippers and proceslors. 57

The Secretary of Agriculture •oontro lled

tne entire procesl through hia power to license all who handled both agricultural goods and competing artoiles of

~rade.

All these procedures had their counterpart in tormer laws or at lealt
in tormer agi ta tiona.

As early

&I

1923. the annual report ot the Seoretary

ot Agrioul ture advooated the prrrohase and sto rage ot surplusel by the
government. 58 And it is a pithy fact that in November, 1926, President
coolidge, the Republicans' tamous conservative, appointed a speoial committee headed by Eugene Meyer to tinance the storage of 4,000,000 bales of
cotton. 59

Other examples are numerous.

The underlying principle of the

Curtis-Crisp Bill (S 5088), introduced into Congress OD January 6, 1921,
and ot the stabilization oorporations of the Federal Farm Board was the
buying and holding ot lurplus products .60

Thil aame principle

was

in part

the basil of the two YcNary~augen Billa which Coo11dge vetoed 61 and of the
Jones-Ketchum Bill the 70th Congress considered. 62 A commillion of bulinel.
men aSlembled to study the needs of agriculture in the United States recommended the stabilizing of t arm pricel and incomes through the agenoy ot a
ltabilizing
57

~.,

co~ration

13; allO,

~

which eventually would be able to buy crops at a
ReUet

~

Agricultural

Adjultment~,

22-23.

58nReport at Secretary ot Agrioulture," Agriculture Yearbook, 1923,
Washington, 1924, 15.
59
'
Black, Agricultural Reform!!.:!:!!! Un1ted States, 72.

6~bid., 73; Cy'reUional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Seas., 1955; Wilbur and
Hyde, 153, 15 •
61 PubUo Affairs Pamphletl,

!!. .!!"

2.

62Black, Agricultural Reform !! ~ United States, 261
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prioe announ~d before the date of planting.53

In November, 1927, Seoretary

of Agrioul ture Jardine. in the artiole previously quoted supported a plan
for stabilization oorporations to buy and store surpluses. 54
Preoedent for donation to the needy of supplies purohased by the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation was provided by like oontributions of
the Federal Farm Board's Grain and Cotton Stabilization Corporations,65
while the sale of exoess Pacifio Northwest wheat at world prices with loss
to.the government at

once reoalls the debenture plans of the late '20's.

The policy followed by the Commodities Credit Corporation of lending
against orops to permit holding also had its antecedents.

For example, it

harked back to the sub-treasury plan of 1892, 66the WarehouseBill of 1916,67
and the Farm Board of 1929,68not to mention, of course, a similar service by

63John D. Blaok, -Progress of Farm Relief," The Amerioan Economio Review,
June, 1928, No.2, American Eoonomic Association, Evanston, Illinois, 1928,
XVIII, 108, citing 'fhe Condition of Agriculture in the United States and
Measures for Its Improvement, A Report of the BuSiness Men's CoIDlDiasion-on
Agricul ture; National Industrial ConterenceB"oard and Chamber of Commerce
of the United States, Washington, 1927, 185.
64

Blaok, Agriou1tural Refor.m in the United States, 352, oiting Oklahoma
Stookm&n~Far.mer, November 1, 1921

65First Annual Report of the Farm Credit Administration, Washington, 1934,
117
o •

66

~

67.

-

- --

Chicago Tribune, July 2, 1892.

~

Report 60, 64th Cong •• 1st Sessa 2.

68wUbur and Hyde, 151.
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banking establishments allover the country for many years.

,.

Prior to the

reorganization of agricultural credit under the "New Deal,- the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had a180 extended this aid. 69
In seeking a parallel from the Plst for the s r a t management practiced
by the Secretary of Agricul ~re under the AAA., we are reminded that one

historian found in President Roosevelt an echo of the two Progressives,
Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. 70 It is true that there is an identity
of spirit in the three administrations, and one find. a nexua between the
licensing ot prooessors and distributors by the -New Deal" and the government licenSing of warehousemen under the Bill of 1916.

Indeed, Frederic P.

Lee told the House Committee on Agriculture and Forestry that he understood
the "New Deal" plan was .imply an extension of the power of the federal
government in warehousing.71

A ~econd link was the regulation of trade

practices under the _rketing agreements

0

f the Agricul tur.. l Adjustment Act.

1hese were in apiri t, at 1e ast, reminiscent of some of the fair practice.
legislation of both the "Square Deal" and the "New Freedom" and those laws
were an answer to the long insistent demands ot far.mers for the regulation
of elevators, distribution agencies, and the great oommodity exohanges. 72
69
House Dooument, 631, 72d Cong., 2d Se8s., 3.
7Dundley, 8
7lCongressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Se8s., 3077.
72w. B. Biuel,l , The Green Rising, Maomillan, N. Y., 1926, 166; Allen NevirJl,
~ Emergence oT'llOdern America, 1865-1878, (!. Hiatory 2.! American Lite,
ed. by Arthur
Schleaing and Dixon Ryon Fox, Macmillan, N. Y., 19l'2"),"
III, 164, 165.
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Lastly, the power given the Secretary to oontrol the flow of "roduce
to market tound natural baokgrounds in existing insti tution& and im. former
recommendations and congressional action.

For example, Representative

Clarke of New York, in addressing the House on the AAA, reterred to "the
warehouse system that provides tor orderly assembling in maD¥ portions ot
the united States ot products olose to the source ot production in order
that they may be orderly sent out [ sic] into the markets 1Vb.en the market,
need them, and the great marketing agencies that advise when these products
of the tarmers may be shipped. 7~

In April, 1924, a bill was introduced

into Congress whioh, it passed, would have provided tor an elaborate

00-

operative marketing system closely tied to the gover.nment by a tederal
administration board.

It was known as the Capper-Williams Bill (H. R.8679)

and was, in part, the work of Seoretary ot Commerce Hoover. 74

The Capper-

Haugen Bill ot 1925 embodied a provision tor olea ring associations to distribute produce between difterent markets to prevent gluts and shortages •.
This idea was not original with the Congressmen but had been inspired by a
recommendation ot the Agricultural Conterence of tarm leaders called by
Presi~.nt Coolidge in the winter ot"1924-l925. 75

In June, 1926, the Fes.

Bill (8 4462) provided" tor an administrative division ot cooperative marketing in the United States Department ot Agriculture.
73
74
75

Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1508.
B1e. ck, "Progress at Farm Reliet," 263.
Black, Agricultural Retorm!!:

~

United States, 350

Its railon d'etre
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waS to provide friendly assistance to oooperative •• 76 Another blli, Ipon.ored by Senator Curtis in several sessions of Congress, would have allowed
the organization of 76 percent or more ot the produoers of each commodity on
a nation-wide basis and would l'a ve set up a "marketing board" to feed oommodi ties to the market in an orderly fashion. 77

It required no long stride

to step from the sentiment inherent in these bills to the power oonferred on
Seoretary Wallaoe by the AAA.
1his analysis of the .urplus program of the "New Deal" provides us with
two generalizations pertinent to our lubject.
broad sen.e, a realization ot McNary-Haugenism.

First, the program was, in a
McNary-Haugen Bills sought

to raise the domestic price of farm products, the Roosevelt surplul policiel
had the .ame purpose; ' MoNary-Haugenismwould have 1014 surplu.e. abroad, the
Trade Agreements Act aimed at a like disposal; indirectly JlcNary-Haugen
plana proposed to curtail production, the Agricul turd Adjus"bnent .lot direot
ly provided tor such reduction.

We even find that the final McNary-Haugen

bill, vetoed in 1928, advocated a tax on processors and distributors "to
collect funds for orderly'marketing.,,78
The second induction is limply a verification

ot our original contentio

that the "New Deal" production and marketing program was essentially a huge
cooperative endeavour, uniting farmers and government, and that this united
effort was "the culmination of a long mvement in that direction.

Our

76Black, "Progress of Farm Relief," 264.
77
78

Black, Agricultural Reform.!!:.!!,!! United States, 361
Seligman, 261; Blaok,nPians for Bailing Prices of Farm Products by
Government Aotion," 381.
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discussion has made the truth of this assertion .elf evident, it .eema, but
.e J1IIAy add that the lIHew Dealer." reoognized the oooperative nature of their
surplus plans.

Chester Davie proudly reported, "The launohing of the great-

est oooperati ve effort ever undertaken by farmers is the outstanding accomplishment

0

f the Agrioul tunl Adjustment Admini stra tion' s ti rat year ~ ,,79

~~----------------~
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QJAPTER II
FARM

CREDIT

In 'the agrioul tural eoonomy of the nation the problem of farm oredi t
antedated that of cOJllDOdity surpluses.

In fact, from colonial times it

was an integral part of the question of agrarian expansion and welfare.
Between World War I and the advent of 'the "New Deal" it assumed vast importanoe, for
ing rate.

fa~

~e

indebtedness increased during that period at an

ala~-

spiralling advanoes were oaused, in the first place" b7

the expenditures entailed in war-inspired additions to the

fa~

plant;

greatly enhanoed tax and interest payments were a natural consequence.

Aa

the 1920's rolled on, the sagging prices and ourtailed trade whioh were a
part of the lurplus problem augmented the burden of these first debts and
became the spur to further heavy borrowing.

Fa~

mortgage indebtedneu

by 1930 was about nine billions of dollars, and the exchange value of agrioul tural products in terms of taxes and interest became so low in some
part. of the country as to be a very serious matter. l
succinctly

SUMS

up the critical aituation

&S

Ernest Lindley

it was When Roosevelt took

oftioe wi'th 'these words s
Disregarding a mountain of supplementary
debt, the farming industry 118.8 saddled wi ttl
1

See Appendix II J W.Stull Holt, 'lb.e Federal Fa~ Loan Bureau, Ita RistoR'
Aotivities and Organization, Servioe Monographs O'f"'the U.S.GeM. No.4,
'lb.e Johns R~n. Press, Baltimore, 1924, 4, oiting C.M.Tbompson, Cost
and Sources of Fa~ Mortgaie Loans in the Uni ted States, Departmento1'
Agrioul ture BU'ii'8trn 384;oodruti', 32:-Oi ting W. Coombs, Taxation of Farm
Property, Department of Agriculture Bulletin No o 172, 1930, 5.
- 2
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between eight and nine billion dollar. in mortgages. Those mortgages had been incurred when
the general price level, on a rough average, was
twioe as high ae it 1I8.S at the beginning of 1933,
and when the prioe of farm production was, on the
average, four times What it was at the end of 1932.
In terms of power to buy finiehed goode, the farm
credi tor had lent only half 'Nbat was owed him; in
terms of farm crope, the farmer owed four times I.e
moh a. he had borrowed. 'lbe cost of current opel"!- . .
ations of government, which he paid through taxee,
1I8.S from r-0 to four timee ita former coat in tenDS
of orop••
In the monthe prior to Roosevelt's inauguration, this oondition led to
violenoe in the heart of the farm region. 3

The last ~me Duok" congrees

failed to retrieve the aituation, oonsequently, it wae neoessary that the
new administration immediately oope, not only With the exigenoies of agricultural surplusea, but, also, with what was another facet of the lame
problem--e.grioul tural oredi t.

To quote Lindley again, " ••• the sharp ory from the farm belt was for
immediate prevention of foreclosures, and for the generous gOTernment aid
in meeting interest payments and taxes ••• w4
satiefy theae demands.

The government attempted to

Title II of the agricultural relief bill and a later

series of supplementary aots oontained legislation fashioned to ease the
burden of the farm debt through liberalization of the mortgage structure;
The Farm Oredi t Aot of June, 1933, proposed to relieve credit stringenoy by

2~.!!.!., 62.
Srn the middle of i932, groups of ll1ddle Western farmers united in an attemp
to prevent mortgage foreolosures and to raile prices by holding oODlllodi ties
from market. Foroe was frequently necessary to aooomplish their purpoae.
2he organization ohiefly responsible for this movement was the Farmers'
Holiday Assooiation. See Woodruff, 101-105, pauimJ also, ~!!!! ~
Timea, January 5, 8, 10; April 28, 29, 1933.
4.Qf.!!!., 99.
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ooordinating and extending the facilities of the credit struoture flready in
existenoe.

These legislative meaaures were

10

designed as to give imaediate

relief and to provide adequate rural credit for year. to come.
A review, first, of the existing oredi t meohanilm. which, at the insistence of far.m leaders, had been built up by the federal government over
a period of twenty years, and, secondly, of the history of certain mortgage
law8, will proTide evidence that no radical departures were deviled.

Rather,

in addition to the fact that no new devices were employed, it is thilstudJ
which offers the conclusive evidence that the cooperative potential of the
"New Deal" was the flowering

0

f the cooperative spiri t the government had

oarefully oultivated for 80me years.
A demand for increased credit tacUi ties and a broader basil for credit
had been one of the rallying points of the three great agrarian .movementl
between the Civil War and the turn of the oentury.

In the first decade of

the new century, agitation for government aid in improving the farmer's
credit was intenaified.

This was, in effect, a demand for government help

to attract capital into agriculture aa it had been attraoted into industry.
Earl Sylvester Sparks, a reoognized authority on agricultural credit, sayls
"This was probably one 01 the inevitable reaulta of the commeroialization ot
agrioul ture.

The farmer _s now produoing for the market on a large scale

Wi th extensive machinery, and his oredi t needl had grown With the price of

land and the necessity of large oapital outlays in equipment.,,5

But, it

capi tal was to be attracted into rural fields, standardization ot the farmer's credit was necessary.
~rl Sylvester Sparks, Hhtory!!!! Theory ~ Agricultural Credit in the

United State.

Thoma. Y. Crowell Co.

N.Y.

1932

114.

-----
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The first step in this direotion was President Theodore
appointment, in 1908, of the Country Life Commission.
fa~

Roose~elt's

This group studied

conditions and reported a need for better credit faoilities.

interest in the question grew.

Public

In 1912, President Taft instruoted the

United States ambassadors in the prinoipal European countries to investigate
rural oredi t institutions in those oountries, and, in the same yel!-r, the
Southern Commercial Congress appointed the so-called Amerioan Commission to
carryon a similar study.

In 1913, President Wilson assembled the United

states Commdssion to cooperate with the Amerioan Commission and to formulate
resolutions.

Their report was made in November of 19136 and deoidedly in-

fluenced subsequent legillation.
While this investigation was being pursued and its report prepared,
Congress was engaged With the bill which beoame known as the Federal Reserve
Aot.

It oontained seotions providing for rural oredi t.

Under the National

Banking Act, no national bank oould make original loans on farm mortgages
but, as members of the Federal Reserve System, national banks were empowered,
provided they were not looated in a oentral reserve oity, to make loans
seoured by improved and unenoumbered land I!Ii tuated Wi thin the federal reserve
distriot.

The banks were alao permitted to rediscount agrioul tural paper

and in this respeot agrioul ture was shown speoial favor.

Commeroial paper

eligi ble for discount oould have a maximum maturi ty of DOt more than ninety
days but agrioul tural paper with a maturity of as DDlch as six months was
acceptable.
6

Furthermore, under the Act agrioul tural paper oould be purchased

Senate Dooument 214, 63d Cong., 1st Se8s.

~------------------~~------------------------3-3~
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tor certain fiscal functions.

To accomplish these ends

~

credit

mechanism organized on lines very similar to the Federal Reserve System was
set up.

Corresponding to the Federal Reserve Board was the Federal Farm

Loan Board; analogous to the federal reserve banks were the lederal land
bankS; and oomparable to the member banks ot the Federal ReserVe System
were the national farm loan aasociations of the agricultural credit system •
. There the struotural likeness ended.

The agricultural system had, as it

were, a luper-struoture in the joint-stock land banks.
The Federal 'arm Loan Board had the power to organize and oharter the
federal land banks, the national farm loan assooiations and the joint-stock
land banks.

It, furthermore, exercised a general

these institutions.

superviso~

author! ty over

The exeoutive otficer of the board was one of its mem-

bers designated by the president as Farm Loan Commissioner.

Conneotion with

the system was lDflintained by the federal government through the Seoretary
of Treasury who

'WaS

opairman and member

~

officio ot the board.

The Farm Loan Act divided the country into twelve land bank distriots
roughly oorresponding to the federal reserve distriots.

In 8aoh of these

a federal lan4 bank was established by the oooperative eftorts of the federa
government and the farmers.

ot $6 eaoh was required.

An initial ' capitalization of $750,000 in share.

Theoretically, this could be subscribed by any

person, firm, oorporation and state as well as by the United States government, but as a matter ot faot, nearly all the original capital of the twelve
banks was oontributed by the tederal government free of oharge.

To attract

loanable funds to agriculture, the banks were empowered to issue and sell

r-r--" _ _ _ _- - . . .

r

I
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debenture bonds based on all the assets of the land banks and,

as~n

entice-

ment to investors, these bonds were exempt from all taxation and made law1ul
investments for fiduoiary and trust funds.
Like the federal reserve banks, these banks did not loan di reotly to
individual patrons.

Loans could be aeoured through duly inoorporated banks,

trust oompanies, mortgage or savings insti tutiona ohartered by the state
in which the loan was made.

But, sinoe Congress wished to foster a spirit

of oooperation among far.mers, the preferred agenoy was the farm loan assooiation.

7he latter could be ohartered when ten or more farmers, who

were owners or prospective owners of farm land, applied for an aggregate
loan of $20,000 or more.

Those desiring loans subsoribed for one ahare of

stook in the assooiation for every $100 of the proposed loan and the capital
for this transaction oould be inoluded in the faoe of the loan.

The borrow-

er allo gave a first mortgage on his land to the assooiation whioh endorsed
it and sent it to the distriot land bank.
for the debenture bonds.

There it was used

a8

aeouri ty

The assooiation, when applying for loans for its

members, likewise was required to buy capital stook of the bank at the rate
of five peroent of the loan.
a farm loan association
banks •• 10

"In case of loans through agents

the borrowers

other than

bought " stook direotly of the loan

Cash payment for the stook when the loan ... s granted was a con-

di tion of the loan.

The stook was retained by the bank as collateral but

any di'ridends on it reverted to the aasociation. Upon full payment of
10Sparks, 129.
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the mortgage loan both the bank stook and assooiation stook were rttired •
Sinoe the need was for oapital on whioh returns would be slow, all loans
were amortized for not les8 than five or more than forty years.

After tive

years all or any part ot a loan oould be paid on any interest paying d,.,te.
This method, it Will be noted, provided an admirable safeguard tor 'tne
sy'stem in that it established an automatio ratio ot 1 to 20 between the
capitalization of the banks and their loans.
Furthermore, provision was made for the borrowers gradually to gain
ownership of the banks. Whenever the capital stock sub.cribed by far.. loan
assooiations in any bank equalled the original capital of .750,000, seBdannually, thereafter, 25 per cent of any further subsoriptions were applied
to the retirement of government-owned stooke

By the end ot 1929, far.aer-

borrowers had almost oQmplete ownership of their respeotive land banks_
The joint-stook land banks, for which the Farm Loan Act provided, were
organized by' private investors, not less than ten in number, who JIIlst subsoribe for at leaat $250,000 worth ot stock and assume a definite liability.
The United States government could not buy or subsoribe for any ot the
capital stook of these banks.

Joint-stock land banks oould be eatablished

in any part of the oountry where the loan buainess waa good enough to
attraot them and they could loan directly both to the farmers of the state
in whioh they were organized and to those of one oontiguoul state.

It was

hoped that their oompetition would ease credit oonditiona in such localitie .
In accordance with the Federal Farm. Loan Act, bonds based on

mort~ges

aocepted by the banks could be issued to obtain loanable funda.

Sinoe many

r~
' --------------~
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•

of these banks eventually became insolvent and were the object of special
treatment by the "New Deal-, it is important to note here that the Federal
Farm Board exeroised only a limited control over their banking polioies.
ihe Federal Farm Board :aanaged this vast system with the aid of a
bureau called the Federal Farm Loan Bureau.

It was oreated for this pur-

pose in the Treasury Department and 'Was charged With the execution ot the
oredit aot and the amendments thereot.

11

1he heavy borrowing of tarmers in 1he latter years ot World War I and
in the first years thereafter attests to the suocess of the land bank sy.·
tam.

The obligations then incurred largely aocount tor the taot that in·

creasing and more insistent pleas for What was oalled intermediate oredits
were heard.

These were loans for a period longer than that given by oountry

banks but shorter than that granted by the federal land banks.

When the

recession of the early 20's oame, such loans were needed to pay the interest
on oapital loans and to finanoe the produotion ot orops whose returns must
pay ourrent expenses and oapital installments.
As early as 1918 the federal government had given reoognition to this
type of requirement and thus set a preoedent.

In an exeoutive order, July

26, 1918, President Wilson instructed the Seoretary ot Agriculture to make
loans for seed grains to farmers in drought areas trom a tund ot five
11

Sinoe our general purpose is a conoern for the baokgrounds ot what was
apparently -new,- it is interesting to note here that in 1891 W.A.Petfer.
a Kansas farmer, suggested a loan bureau in the Treasury Department whioh
would establish a oentral loan agenoy in eaoh state oapital with looal
agencies at convenient looalities, to loan money on real-estate. W~.
Petfer, The Farmer'. Side, His Troubles and Their Remedy, D.Appleton and
Co., N.Y:;-189l. 249.- -
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million dollars which had been appropriated tor national security a11d detense.
Subsequently, Congress continued this lending practice. Appropriations tor
emergency crop production and seed loans were made in eight difterent years
between 1921 and 1933.

They were handled by the Crop Production and the Seed

Loan Otfice set up in the Department of Agriculture. 12
Another emergency measure of the same type 'Was the bill, passed January
3 and 4, 1921, which revived the War Finance Corporation that it might assist
the tinancing ot the exportation of agricultural produot..

Through thil

agency advanoes were made to cooperative associations to help them oarry
ootton in warehouses until it could be exported, and to tinance the carrying

ot American cotton in foreign warehouses.

Eventually, this service was ex-

tended to the carriers of Wheat, dried truits, canned truits and vegetables.
In August, 1921, the Corporation was authorized to malee "advances to persons,
firma. or corporations outside ot the Uni ted States which purchase our agricultural products ••• •

provided these loanl were . backed b,y collateral held

in the United Statel.

The Corporation could allo loan to agencies supplying

agricultural credit. 13
These loans. however. represented emergency measures. whereas
leaders wanted a permanent system of

inte~ediate

credits.

ta~

These were the

years of the "Agricultural Bloc" in Congress and this group of determined
advocates finally secured such a device.
In May and June of 1921, the Senate and House, respectively, appointed
a Joint Commission ot Agrioul tural Inquiry to hold hearings on the tarm

12
For an example ot such an appropriation see HOUle Report 698, 66th Cong.,
2nd Seu.
1341 Stat. L •. 1084: 42 Stat. L •. 181.
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situation and offer reoommendations.

Their report, given October 15, 1921,

stated that existing credit facilities for farmers were inadequate and that
a system of intermediate credits was desirable. 14

The oo~ssion allo sub-

mitted a tentative bill known as the Lenroot-Anderson Bill but no conolusive
action was taken on it.

The next year, 1922, Senator Lenroot submitted a

general agrioultural credit bill and Senator Capper introduoed one providing
for credit tor 11 vestook dealers.

Both bills passed the Senate.

In the

House the two bills were united and certain amendments tormulated by Representati ve Strong to liberalize the Federal Farm Loan Aot of 1916 were added
to them.

All three were passed Maroh 3, 1923, as the Intermediate Credit.

Act. l5
The first part of thil bill provided for the creation, in eaoh of the
federal land bank distriots" of twelve new bank..

They were placed under

the lupervision of the Federal Farm Board and the officers and director. ot
the land banks were ex offioio officers and directors ot the new banks.
Known as federal intermediate oredi t banks, they extended oredi t for not
less than six months or more than three years.
Contrary to the policy followed in regard to the land banks, sole
ownership of the intermediate credit banks was retained by the federal
government.

The Secretary of the Treasury was authori zed to sub.ori be

$5,000,000 tor oapital stook in eaoh bank.

Collateral trust debentures

seoured by agricultural and 11veatook paper could be issued by the banks

l~ouse Report 408, Pa~t II, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 5Chambe rlain, 284-286, passim.
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to obtain additional funds.

Also, they could sell their

acceptan~s

in the

open market and, subjeot to certain restrictions, they oould rediscount
paper with the federal reaerve banks. IS
Since it was believed that local agencies could best evaluate an
individual farmer's needs and seourity, Congress provided that loans from
intermediate credit banks must be made through suoh institutions.

State,

aational and savings banks were, of course, available for suoh service, but
in order to give the fanner more avenues of approaoh to the intermediate
banks, this function was also extended to agrioultural oredit corporations.
Included in this category were any corporations organized under the laws of
any state to loan money for agricultural purposes or for the railing, breeding and fattening of livestock.

A wide variety of local credit agencies

oame under this definition, among them cooperative banks, cooperative credit
associations, trust companies and incorporated livestock loan oompanie••
Thus, as

'WaS

the case in regard to federal land bank: loans" the farmer

could not borrow direotly from intermediate credit banks but he could create
organizations which could borrow for him.
It will be noted that this arrangement provided some standardiZAtion
for cattle paper, a need that experiences of the War Finance Corporation in
dealing with livestook loans had exposed.

But it was felt that even more

scope tor this aotivity must be devised and that certain evils in livestook
l6Seotion 404 ot the Intermediate Credits Act amends the Federal Reserve
Act to enable federal reserve banks to handle agrioultural paper for a
longer time and inoreases the amount that may be loaned to an individual
fanner on his mortgage. ~ stat. L., 1479.

..
financing must be remedied.

40

Banks frequently operated oattle loan oompanies

as subsidiaries and failed to separate their commercial banking from their
loan business.

This praotice was prolific ot economic vices which statel

were slow to eradicate.

As a consequence, Title II of the Federal Inter-

mediate Oredi ts Aot provided for the inoorporation of national agrioul tural
credit oorporations and for redisoount corporations l7 which would be subjeot
to inspection by federal agents.
here.

The National Banking Aot served al a model

In faot, the prooedure to be followed in organizing these corpor-

ations was almost identioal With that required for the organization of
national banks and state ohartered corporations could be oonverted into
national banks in praotically the same manner that state banks could become
national banks.

As originally planned, these enterprises were to be purely

pri va te in nature wi th no relation to the federal credit system and it was
hoped that the banks would beoome their sponlors. However, on Maroh 4,
1925, an amendment giving them the right to rediscount their paper with

intermedia te oredi t banks made them an integral part of the intermediate
system.
Spark's concise evaluation of intermediate credit legislation ahows
that it aocomplished in its sphere what the Federal Farm Loan Act suoceeded
in doing .in its metier.

The system it oreated, Sparks says. has helped to

standardize agricultural paper "by better credit analyses, and by issuing

17 The difference . between the two was a matter of oapitalization. A national
agrioultural credit corporation mst have capital of $250,000 but one
which was capitalized for at least $1,000,000 oould redisoount paper
previously diloounted by another oorporation or bank or trust oompany
whioh was a member of the Federal Reserve System. 42 stat. L. , 1461,
1466; Spa rkl, "12.
-
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short time bonds on the basis ot tarm paper, [thus enabling) agric~l ture to
borrow in the capital markets on a tavorable basia

~th

other industries."

But, he oontinues, the intermediate credit banks were not "emergenoy institutiona."

They oould not give "unlimited oredit during times of depressed

prices and oredit stringenoy."

Rather, they were "investment institutions"

and aoted "a8 intermediaries in the investment of savings"

~ thout

the

commeroial banka' function not inoreasing the ciroulating medium ot exchange. a18

This pointed observation explains the failure of the federal

agricul tural oredi t system to sustain the demands made upon it during the
depression cri.ia of the early 30's and the traming, at that

tim~,

of tur-

ther legislation to enlarge agrioultural oredit taoilitiea.
However, even before the depression set in,agrioultural oonditions
were such that Congress was moved to oreate a new oredit agency of importanoe.

Briefly, its genesia was as tollowa.

In 1927, a Buaineas Men's

Committee was organized by the National Industrial Conference Board and the
United State. Che.mber ot Commeroe to study the .taws ot agrioulture and
propose meaaures tor it. improvement.

As a result ot their reaearch, the

committee suggested the establishment ot a tederal tarm board whoae members
would be appointed by the president and whose duties would be "to aid in
the stabilization ot [agrioultural.] prioes and produotion by advising tarmer. and tarm organizationa ••• regarding planned production and marketing

ot crops.w 19 In the preaidential campaign ot 1928, both major parties
l8Reterenoes for this disoussion of the intermediate oredit sy.tem were,
~ Stat. L., Part I, 1454-1482; Sparks, 287-430, passim, the evaluation
quoted above is found on pages 429-430; Holt, 57; The First Annual Report
~ ~ ~ Credi t Administration, Washington, 193-:r;-25-32, pauim.
19Gee , 37, oiting Re rt ot Business Men's Comnnssion ~A5riculture. 32.
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promised aotion to improve the farmer's lot. After his victory,

~eaident

Hoover felt the neoessity of implementing the Republican promises.

His

laiasez faire tendencies oaused him to prefer aa little governmental intrusion in private buainess as possible and he saw in a board, suoh as had been
proposed, an opportunity for government to help agriculture help itself in
the least aggressive fashion.

With his approval the Agrioul tural Marketing

Act became law on June 15, 1929.
Under its authority, as two of Hoover's cabinet officers tell us: "The
Federal Farm Board was set up by President Hoover primarily for the purpose

ot oreating and finanoing farm oooperatives. w20
method of aelt,- help for the tarmers.

This, ot oourse, was a

The Board not only enoouraged oooper-

atives but it enoouraged large ones tor it dealt only With those looal and
regional oooperative marketing assooiations Which met the requirements ot
the Capper-Volstead Act ot 1922, and that aot was framed to permit the tormation of associations whioh might otherwise be prohibited by the anti-trust
laws.

Loans to oooperatives were made trom a revolving fund ot $500,000,000

appropriated for the purpose by Congress.

They oould be _de to finanoe

various oooperative aotivities, among them the merchandising ot agricultural
oOllUOOdi ties, the construotion or aoquiei tion ot physioal marketing faoili t
the formation of olearing house aasociations, and the education ot produoers
to the adTantagea of cooperative marketing.21
Aa its partisans maintain, it is probably true that the real value ot

20wilbur and Hyde, 442. The Farm Board's grain stabilization aotivities
have already been discussed.
21
Sparks, 417-419, passim.
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the Feder&l Farm Board oan never be assessed, because it had hardly begun
operations when it was confronted by the unprecedented oonditions produoed
by the finanoial crash of 1929 and the depression whioh followed.

Agricul-

ture, of course, had been in a depressed condition for almost a deoade;
oonsequently, it now bordered on oomplete collapse.

Emergency legislation

was necessary and in January of 1932 Congress passed "An Act to provide
emergency financing facilities for financial institutions to aid in tinancing agriculture, oommerce, and industry and for other purposes.

22

This

bill eventuated in the organization of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on February 2, 1932.

Ch~berlain,

in the work previously quoted,

says that the idea of the RFC stemmed from the success aohieved in a lesser
crisis by the War Finance Corporation.

23

The RFC had capital stock of .500,000,000 subscribed by the United
States government.

Through the Secretary of Agricul iure it ade loau,

secured by first liens on growing or grown orops, in cases where emergenoies existed and farmer. were unable to obtain production loans for 1932.
Agenoies for the Secretary of Agrioulture were savings banks, trust oompanies, mortgage loan oompanies, federal land banks, joint-stook land bank.,
intermediate credit bank., agricultural credit oorporations and livestock
credit corporation..

The federal reserve banks were named a. depositories,

22Reoonstruction Finance corroration Act ~JL~endments, (compiled by Elmer
A.. Lewis, Washington, 1938 , 1.
.
23
Chamberlain also notes that this Act projeoted "the Federal government
into the market as a supplier ot Capital for private enterprise." Op.cit.,
287, 291; !!! ~ Times, Dec. 9, 1931.

rr---~-oustodians and fi80al agents for the RFC.

24

When a second smergency extension of rural credit was deemed necessary
in July, the RFC proved a convenient outlet.

The Emergenoy ReUet and Con-

struction Aot, approved July 21, 1932, amended the Reoonstruotion Finanoe
Corporation Act to perudt the RFC to make loans to finance 8ales of agricultural produots in foreign oountries and to make loans to

~ ~

insti tu-

tiona to enable them to carry and market agrioultural commodities and 11 vestook produced in the United Sta tea.

Further, the RFC was authori zed to

create regional oredit oorporations, one in each of the federal land bank
districts, and to provide $4,000,000 in capital stock for each.

These cor-

porationa were to have discount privileges with the RFC, the federal reserve
banks, and the intermediate credit banks.

It was figured that a total

oredit somewhat in exoess of $1,360,000,000 would thus be made available.
Loans from these new institutions oould be obtained for orop produotion and
the raising, breeding, fattening and marketing of livestook. 25

These

regional oorporations were the last instruments of rural oredi t whioh the
federal government developed before the Roosevelt administration was inaugurated.
For some time previous to this latter event, it had been recognized
that a reorganization of the entire system, looking to the elimination of
overlapping functions and ot wasteful overhead, was desirable.

24Reconstruotion

Finanoe Corporation Ciroular
August, 1933, 1.

~.!,

For example,

(Revised), Washington,

25Reoonstruction Finanoe Corporation Ciroular No.6, Washington, March, 193
1-4, pauim; Milton S. Eisenhower, "Agricultural-Legislation," American
Yearbook, 1932, 404; Wilbur and Hyde, 444. These , corpora tions were frequently called Agricultural Credit Banks.

45
the agricultural conference called b,y President Coolidge in 1925 directed
attention to duplication of effort and recommended an agenoy to coordinate
the various cndi t sources.

26

When the Agricultural Marketing Act was being

oonsidered in 1929, many protested that credit facilities for the far.mer
were adequate, that what was needed was the elimination of unsound part. of
21
the existing mechanism.
Authority for such aotion was given b,y Congress
on March 3, 1933.

28

Thus, it is evident that the first contribution of the

"New Deal" to agrioultural oredit--the thorough over-hauling ot the oredit
structure to make it more efficient and therefore more effective--w&s an
old idea when the "New Deal" was introduced.
By executive order, effective May 21, 1933, President Roosevelt consolidated all federal agencies dealing primarily with agricultural oredit
into a single organization

m01llIl

as the Farm Credit Administration. An act

of June 16, 1933, called the Farm Credit Act, confirmed and completed this
merger.
The pattern ot organization worked out for the new structure was as
follows.
governor.

At the head of the system was an executive officer known as the
29

He was assisted qy two deputies, a general counsel, and four

co~ssioners.

26

Each of the latter supervised a special field of activity.

John D. Black, "Progress of Farm Relief," 263.
27 Sparks, 435.
28
41 Stat. L., 1517.
29Schmeckebier holds that this ottice was the equivalent of that of Chairman of the Farm Board, which, of course, was abolished. .2f.~., 25.
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One, the Land Bank COmmissioner,30 had juriSdiction over the twe1;e federal
land banks, the national farm loan associations, the jOint-stock land banks,
and Land Bank Commissioner loans. A second, called the

Inte~ediate

Credit

Commissioner, controlled the work of the twelve intermediate oredit banks.
A new

organi~ation,

~e

Bank for Cooperatives, took over all the functions,

except those of stabilization, entrusted to the

Fa~

Board.

Direoting the

Bank and its aotivities was the Cooperative Bank Commissioner.

The fourth

commissioner, the Production Credit Commissioner, headed a set of produotion credit oorporations created by the Farm Credit Act to replaoe the
31
regional agricultural credit corpora tiona organi ~ed by the RFC.
These officials had their headquarters in

Wa~hington.

D.C., and exer-

oised their authority through branoh offices in the twelve regions of the
United States corresponding to the twelve federal land bank districts.
The organization of each distriot was described as follows in the First
Annual Report

£! ~ ~

Credit Administration:

In each district organi~ation there are four
per.manent oredit institutions--a Federal land
bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank. a production cndi t corporation, and a bank for cooperatives--ln addition to local national farm
loan associations and production credit associations. The four main oredit institutions are
30

The old Federal Farm Loan Board and Bureau were also abolished. The only
office retained 198.S that of Farm Loan Commissioner. The Farm Credit Aot
changed the title of this funotionary to that of Land Bank Commissioner
and transferred to him the powers of the former Board. 48 Stat. L., 273;
First Annual Report 2! ~ ~ Credi t Administration, 4;Sohmeokebier, 26.

31

The Crop Production and Seed Loan Offices of the Department of Agriculture
were a180 transferred to the Farm Cred! t Administration but seem to have
been under the immediate control of the governor and his deputies. First
Annual Report ~ ~ ~ Credit Administration, 5.

rr-'
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located in the same city and have the same
direotors. Unified polioy is assured through
the single board of direotors, sitting as a
ooordinating body known as the "Council of the
Farm Credit Administration for the distriot."
Coordination of acti vi ties and avoidanoe of
unneoessary duplioation of personnel and facilities have been seoured through an executive
officer oalled the "General Agent" nominated
by the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration and appointed by the dist.rict oouncil, aoting with the presidents of the four leR~ng
institutions as an advisory comDdttee.

•

Tha t the "New Deal" inherited this rural oredi t system almost intaot
seems to be beyond dispute.

If there were any entirely new or hitherto

unthought-of factors present, they would neoessarily be found in the one
or two changes that were made.

These call for examination.

One innovation was the gradual liquidation of the joint-stock land
bank..

This action on the part of the administration was in keeping wi til

previous opinion on the matter.

~ree

Ship in 1927, three more in 1932.

of the banks had gone into reoei ver-

No less a person than President Hoover

stated in a speeoh delivered Ootober 4, 1932, "The oharacter of the organization of the Joint-Stock Land Banks Whose business methods are not oontrolled by the Federal Farm Loan Board has resulted in disastrous and unjust pressure for payments in some of these banks.

The basiS of that

organization should be remediedo" 33
A seoond change was the Cooperative Bank System.

But here, too,

purpose and struoture were, in general, aooording to preoedent. As ita
name implies, thia system was established to continue the work of supplying
32Ibid •
33 Ibid •

69

60· Wilbur and H de

446.
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oredit for oooperatives whioh

th~

Fam Board had begun.

To this

e~d,

the

revolving fund oreated for the Board by the Agrioul tural Marketing Aot
was invested in the capital stook of the cooperative banks.

Struotural

outlines and the loaning policy of the new system resembled that of the
Federal Land Bank System.

Equivalent to the latter's governing board was

the Central Bank for Cooperati vas located in Washington; comparable to the
twelve federal land banks were the twelve banks for cooperatives, one in
eaoh land bank distriot. As in the oaS8 of the land banks, loans were made
by the branoh banks to associations whioh were required to purohase stock
in the bank at the tille of borrowing.

The parallel in this respeot extends

even to the fact that this stook was retired when the loans were oancelled.
Both systems were authorized to secure loanable funds by selling debentures
based on assets.

One deviation was in the fact that the Central Bank for

Cooperatives made direot loans to assooiations, if the tace value of the
o

loan exceeded $400,000.

34

The produotion credit oorporations, as has been said, were de.tgned
to take over the work of the regional agricultural credit corpora tiona.
~e

latter were temporary institutions to tide over an emergenoy, whereas

the production credit oorporations were to be part of a permanent oredit
system.

Therefore, it was planned that as the one expanded, the other

would contract.

The new oorporations oombined features ot two or three

older oredit agencies.

Their nature and purpose

80

resembled the regional

agrioul tural oredi t corpora tiona that, in framing the Farm Credit Aot,
34
First Annual Report 2!
Wilbur and Hyde, 156.

~ ~

Credit Administration, 35-42, passim;
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Congress thought it wise to state that the Act should Wnot be

con~rued

to

repeal subsection (e) ot section 201 of the Emergenoy Relief and Construotion Act of 1932"

35

whioh authorized the regional oorporations.

There was

one produotion oredit corporation in eaoh federal land bank distriot.

They

enjoyed disoount privileges with the intermediate oredit banks and organi0811y they were to the intermediate banks what member banks were to the
federal reserve banks, a facility through Which the intermediate banks
could work.

W.I.Meyers, Governor of the Fel, explained the need for them

as follows,
Previously the laok of finanoially responsible local institutions, able and willing
to endorse and rediscount borrowers t notes,
has severely restricted the services of the
intermediate oredit banks in providing production credit. Farmers requiring loans
were frequently unable to raiae the necessary
capital to organize livestock loan companies
or agrioultural oredit corporations whiCh
could qualify for disoount privileges and
oommeroial banks made litt!& use of the intermediate oredit faoilities.
To reaoh these groups the

oorpor~tions

employed a liberalized federal

land bank prooedure. Like the federal land banks, they proposed to oontact
their patrons through local produotion credit associations of ten or more
farmer-borrowers, but where the borrowing farmers supplied all the oapital
for their national farm loan assooiations, the production credit corporations subscribed part of the oapital stook of eaoh produotion oredit
assooiation.

Sinoe the initial capital of the produotion credit oorporatio

35

Federal ~ ~ ~ With Amendments ~ ~ Mort,age ~
Aots, (oompiled by Elmer A. Lewis, Washington, 1945 , 160.

3S-

First Annual Re

~

rt of the Farm Credit Administration, 33-34.

Credit
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was supplied by the government from unused or repaid funds origina11y appropriated for seed and orop produotion loans,

37

and the farmers were required

to purohase some stook in the assooiations when a loan was secured, the system was, in essenoe, a oontinuation of the polioy of government-farmer
cooperation which we have noted.
A further attempt of the FCA to assist extremely needy farmers was the
formation of federal credit unions.

38

A credit union was in "method,

operation, and oontrol" a miniature oooperative bank, "concerned with the
very small units of saving and equally small units of credit."

Credit

unions in the United States date back to the year 1909; by 1930 some thirtytwo statel had legalized them.

In the field of rural credit. they were

ohiefly concerned Wi th expenditures the farmer had to make betore any inoome
resulted trom his labor or operating oapital.

Since shares were purohased

on an installment plan for sometimes as little as ten cents per week, and
interest on loans was kept at a minimum, the FCA could, through this welltried medium, extend aid to the most distressed rural groups.

39

:!he establishment of these new agencies was not the only method of expanding credit facilities.

!he federal land banks were enable to acoommodat

many whom they formerly could not serve by legislation whioh authorized them
to lend directly to farmers in regions Where loan associations did not exist
37

.!! Stat.

38

L., 258.

Authorized by act of Congress on June 26, 1934.
39
Sparks, 362-266, passim.

Sohmeokebier, 33.

51
or where existing associations were not financially able to acoept• applications.

40

The loaning funds of the RFC were increased by. $300,000,000, and

intermediate oredit banks were empOwered to loan to produoers cooperative
purchasing assooiations as well as to cooperative marketing groups. 41

These

last two expedienoies were obviously in the spirit of former praotice and
Messrs. Wllbur and Hyde claim that President Hoover first reoommended that
federal land banks be permitted to make direot loans.

42

Concurrent with the problem of oonsolidation and multiplication of
oredit agencies, was that of liberalizing the mortgage structure which had
been erected over the years.

Lindley says that the more radical thought

on the question would have had the federal government refinance practically
the entire farm mortgage debt at low rates of interest--rates as low as two
per cent were suggested.

Conservatives, the same authority avers, preferred

government assistance limited to friendly intervention in reducing principal
and the provision of facilities for pooling and averaging mortgages with a
resultant lowering of interest rates. 43

The Roosevelt plan was a compromise

between these two schools of thought.
Under the administration plan, funds for refinancing farm mortgages
were to be secured by the sale of consolidated federal land bank bonds to
40In order that the formation of associations be not discouraged, the rat.
of interest was higher in the cale of direct loans. One object of the
FCA was to establish strong associations. 48 Stat. L. t 44; First Annual
Report of the Farm Credit Administration, 17=18.
41
--48 stat. L. t 50; First Annual Report ~ ~ ~ Credit Administration, 6,
IS; Woodruff, 137, 144.
42

.2.£o~.,

43

.Q£.ill.,

443.
109.
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the amount of $2,000,000,000.
government.

Interest on these bonds was guaranteed by the

Two methods of refinancing were provided:

bonds could be ex-

changed for existing mortgages written down to fifty per cent of the normal
value; or the bonds could be sold and the proceeds used to take
)

gages.

o~r

mort-

Only first mortgage. on farm land were considered for this treatment

In addition, .50,000,000 was appropriated to permit federal land banks to
postpone payment of prinoipal for five years on loans already in existenoe.
44
If a loan was in good standing, interest payments might also be deferred.
For borrowers unable to meet federal land bank requirements more lenient
loans could be advanced by the Farm Loan Commissioner from a fund of
$200,000,000 provided by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

First

or second mortgages on land, ohattel mortgages or liens on orops were aocepted as seourity for these loans, and amortization payments were not to
commenoe until three years from the date of the loan.
Commissioner were the federal land banks.

The agencies for the

The amount of a Commission loaD

together with all prior mortgages or other forms of indebtedness against
the mortgaged property could not exceed 75 per cent of the appraised normal
value of the property and, in any case, not more than $5,000 to any one farmer.

Loans oould be made for the purpose of redeeming any land sold by

foreolosure after July 31, 1931, to pay debts other than mortgages, and for
operating expenses.
44

45

48 Stat. L., 42-43.

45---

~.,

48.
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Since land values had rapidly declined during the 1920' s, the amount
of a mortgage held by the mortgages frequently exoeeded the value of the
farm.

To enoourage the scaling down of the prinoipal of such mortgages,

the FCA adopted the polioy of making no land bank or commission loans unless all previous indebtedness was thereby retired.

Accordingly, when a

land bank loan for 50 per cent of the value of the property plus a oommi8li
loan for 25 per cent did not toioal
ing down was necessary and was

9.S

much as existing indebtedness, scal-

~enerally

accepted by oreditors who would

lose money on a foreclosure sale in any case.
only where original loans were oarelessly made.

This was found necessary
46

The lending structure whioh has been desoribed remained unaltered, but
on January 31, 1934, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation Aot ohanged the
method of financing the federal land banks and the comDdssion loans.
Act provided for the organization of the Federal

Fa~

Thie

Mortgage Corporation

which was placed under the management of the Secretary of Treasury, the
Governor of the

Fa~

Credit Administration and the Land Bank Cormnissioner.

After ninety days, the federal land banks were to o.e ase issuing their oonsol1dated bonds and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation was to issue instead two billion dollars worth of bonds whose interest and prinoipal would
both be guaranteed by the government.

The Farm Loan Commissioner was

directed to use the $200,000,000 advanced him by the RFC to subscribe for
bonds on behalf of the United Stateso

46

Woodruff, 146.

Of the $2,000,000,000, six hundred

54

•

million was alloted to oommission loans, one billion, four hundred thousand
to federal land bank loans.
47
these loans.

The land banks were to continue as agents for

All of this legislation represented the logical consumation of reoommendations, agitation and demands, official and non-offioial, whioh had
been prevalent during the depression period prior to 1933.
some of it, in fact, was of more remote origin.

Precedent for

A few examples will b.

oonolusi ve.
Beginning with a bill introduoed by Senator Frazier of North Dakota
on Deoember 8, 1930, numerous plans tor refinancing farm mortgages at lower
rates of interest were oonsidered by Congress.
advocated the sale of bonds by the

Fede~l

Senator Frazier's bill

Land Bank System, With the pro-

vision that those bonds secured by land mortgages would draw only

It per

cent interest and those backed by chattel liens would draw 3 pe r oent. A
typical proposal was Senator George's of Georgia which would have authorized
the RFC to loan as muoh as three billion dollars to help farmers refinance
their mortgages.

48

President Hoover recommended one such bill.

On Deoember

8, 1931, his message to Congress advocated that .26,000,000 be subscribed
to the federal land banks against which they could issue bonds for land
loans to about one billion dollars. He would have had the RFC buy these
bonds 0

49

1here were many proposals for
47

~

48

mort~age

Stat. L. , 344; Woodruff, 140,141.

Chamberlain, 296-298, passim.
49
Wil bur and H de 443.

moratoria.

One suoh bill passed

~--------------------------56~
the Senate but not the House during Hoover's presidenoy.
proval.

It had hts ap-

Voluntary moratoria were granted by leading insuranoe companies

both at Hoover's request and because resentment in farm regiona made such
action salutary.

Several states went so far as to make such moratoria

compulsory. 50
The period of redemption for foreolosed property refleoted former
state laws. A.M.Woodruff proves this oonolusively. He says that a Kansas
law of 1893, which oontinued in foroe there until 1933, instituted to the
detriment of the creditor, a redemption period of eighteen months.

The

Supreme Court deolared the law oould not apply to mortgages existing at
the time it

ftS

passed, but later, Woodruff points out, the Court upheld

a New York rent law of 1920 whioh oompelled landlords to renew leases at
rates deemed fair and reasonable.

This set a legal precedent sanctioning

interference with a contraot during an emergency.

61

Finally, this legislation followed closely on the years during which
co~ssions

were busy scaling down the debts of the enemy countries of

World War I.

The United stat.s played a leading role in these transaotions,

so the idea was not new to uSo
This evidenoe conoludes a fairly oomprehensive review of "New Deal"
rural credit legislation--a review which highlights each phase against
its own peculiar baokground.

The facts presented seem to justify the

conclusion that in the field of agrioultural credit the "New Deal" aooom50Ibid ., 442; George Soule,

~ Coming Amerioan Revolution, Maomillan,

1934, 181.

5~00drutf, 101-108, oiting 163 U.S. 118 and 268 U.S. 242.
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plishment represented, not a revolution, but the completion of an evolutionary cycle, in which the federal government first encouraged, then joined
hands with the farmers to continue and strengthen a rural cooperative cred1 t
movement.

The words of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., first Governor of the Farm

Credi t Administration, do not belie this deduction. He said:
We intent to assist cooperative enterprises and to promote cooperation. In the
Farm Credit Administration ••• there are four
divisions. Each one of those divisions is
set up on a basis designed to encourage the
cooperative principle in dealing with the
farmer's economic and oredit problems. 52

52

James D. Magee, Willard E. Atkins, Emanuel Stein, 'lb.e National Recovery
Program, F.S.Crofts and Co., N.Y., 1933, 52.
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CHAPTER III

INF'LATION

In addition to the problem of farm surpluses and farm credit, the
a.grloultura.l policy of the "New Deal" was ooncerned with the question of
raising prioe levels through currenoy management.

Title III, better known

as the Thomas Amendment, of the Agrioultural Relief Aot empowered the president to. utilize, at his discretion, various kinds of inflationary measures.
He oould .ask the federa.l reserve banks to buy and hold $3,000,000,000
worth of government bonds, the prooeeds of which would reach the public
ei ther through loans of member banks or through payment of government
expenses.

If the banks failed to cooperate, the president could direct the

Seoretary ot Trea.sury to ilsue legal tender up to $3,000,000,000 worth ot
United States notes.

Out of respeot for 80und-money interests, "a bit of

sleight of hand was inoorporated into this seotion ot the law.

The govern-

ment could use the three billions in non-interest bearing notes or currenoy
to retire outstanding obligations; it could not use them to finance new
1

undertakings, although it oould ••• borrow anew" for the latter purpose.

A.

check on this flow of "printing-paper money" was provided by the stipula.tion
that these notes be oanoelled at the rate of four peroent annually.
The president was also authorized to reduce the gold content of the
1

Lindley, 123.
57

rr

I
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dollar by any amount up to fifty percent and to provide for the unlimited
coinage of both gold and silver at a ratio to be fixed by him.

Further-

more, for a period of one year, he could accept up to $200,000,000 in
silver, at a prioe not to exceed fifty cents an ounce, in paYment of torei
debts and he could cause one dollar silver certificates to be issued
this reserve.

3

The law did not oblige President Roosevelt to resort to any of these
expediencies and all authorities agree that he accepted the broad powers
conferred upon him to avert mandatory inflationary legislation of a more
radical nature.

Lindley notes that Congress showed signs of "getting out

of control" and that "It had become apparent that the Administration could
not get the far:m bill through the Senate without making concessions to the
4

more radical demands of the far:m belt."

The same on-the-spot observer says

that between January and April, 1933, Senator Burton K. Wheeler's fight for
free silver at a ratio of 16 to 1 had won fifteen reoruits in the Senate,
and that Senator James F. Byrnes of South Carolina--an administration watch
dog--informed Roosevelt that Senator Thomas' amendment could not be deS

teated,

Raymond Maley, who at that tim" was, possibly, in the beat positio

to know, confirms Lindley's story and testifies, "The cold tact is that

2The Gold Reserye Act of' 1934 pe~tted a variation up to sixty percent of
the former go d content of tha dOllar. Beard and Smith, 85-86.

~indley, 121; Arthur Whipple Crawford, MonetarY ,lIanagement Under ~

!!!!

Deal, Amerioan Council on Public Affairs, Washington, 1940, 46; E.E. Lewis,
~imer of the New Deal, Amerioan Eduoation Press, Inc., N. Y., 1933, 35.

~ndley o;;;e~;:- ~evelt
.2.f. ~., 113-120, passim.

5

administration as a Washington correspondent.
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the inflationary movement attained suoh formidable strength by APrtl 18th
that Roosevelt realized that he could not block it, that he could. at
, 1t 6
most, try to direot it.
This situation was not surprising.

Tne farmers were desperate; they

were, as we have shown, organized for Tiolenoe on rural frontl and for
action in Oongrel., and they had inherited from former generationl of
farmers a firm faith in inflation as the remedy for their ills.

~ley

pbilolophizes about it in this 7ein:
It was natural that inflationary sentiment should
express i teelf in the fo rm 0 f amendment to the farm
bill. 1be main purpose of the bill was to raise oommodi ty prioes. '!he idea of doing this through restrioted produotion was not only less dazzling but
leas familia r than the notion that it ooul d be done
through monetary intla tion--a notion touted .. a
remedy for farm ills eTer lince farm produots were
first traded for tokens of value, and deeply rooted 7
in the politioal thinking of the West and Northwest.
Sparks adds this testimony, " ••• farm relief lohemet by means of cheap
money and legillation began in this country With the early colonies and
haTe continued to the present day.

'Inflate the currency, raise pricet

and bring prolparity' hal been a oommon slogan of tarm leaderl during the
various periods of economio depression. 1t8
1bough we do not forget the monetary polioies pre_lent during the
War of 1812 and in the West prior to the Oi vil War, the period most readily

6. Raymond MOley, After Seven Year., Harper and Brothers, N.Y., 1939, 157.
MOley oall' Lindley the best hiltortan of the Roosevelt regime up to
1939, 13.
7

8

~., B.
~.

!!!_,

19.
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• followcalled to mind by these observations ie, probably, that immediately
ing the Oivil War.

1J)lring those decades the farmers supported their in-

flationary demands by national organization for political action.
ille Oi viI war had in plrt been financed by the isaue of $400,000,000
in legal tender note. whose

~lue

half their face value in gold.

at the end of the conflict was about

Farmers ot the country borrowed

heavil~

in thia medium during the war and were still burdened with these debts whe:a
the gOTerDlllent embarked upon a policy of gradual contraction of paper
•

currency and of resumption of specie payments in December, 1865.

For the

farmer of the late 1860's and the 1810's, this meant that While the dollar
remained the ,ame in name, it increased 100 percent in value when compe.red
wi th the property out of whioh his debts DIlst be paid.

Ae

one farmer put

it, "Practioally any law requiring a resumption of specie payment' is a
law adding to the amount of a currency debt the full depreciation of the
currency unte., you ••• scale the debt."

9

Farm and labor groups were able to stop the further reduction of
circulating currency in 1868 but in 1873 silver wal demonetized.
year

laW

a panic and a deepening agricul turd depression.

1hat 8ame

In 1874, the

farmers organized a politioal party with a significant name--the Greenback
Party.

The principal planks in the platform of the Greenbacker, were a

demand that the resumption aot be repealed, and a

declara~10n

which

fa~red

the "issue of legal-tender notel convertible into obligations bearing
9 Peffer, 113.

r
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10
interest not exeeeding one cent per day on each 1100."

...
The party had

.ome sueees. until 1880 after which it gradually declined.
At the end of the ensuing decade, however, a singular coincidence of
events and circumstancel evolnd another farmer'_ party bent on inflation.
First, the Farmer's Alliance, organized in two separate branches, one in
the North, one in the South, during the '80's, had, by 1889, increaled so
tremendously in membership that direct political action was a possibility
from that standpoint; second, economic conditions favored a new farm party,
for crop failures due to drought augmented financial diatre •• throughout
the west; third, a collusion of sil verites and mnufacturing interest. in
Congress resulted in 1890 in the Silver Purohase Act and the MCKinley
Tariff, both of which angered the farmer.

They had been asking for free

silver since the "Crime of '73" and were merely given an increase in the
amount purchased; they wanted lower tariff duties on manufactured goodl
and had to be content with a "more or les8 meaningless 'protection' of
their farm produce.- ll

The result was the formation of the Populist Party

at Cincinnati in May, 1891. 'While this party had other objectives, it is
principally remembered for its advocacy in the next five years of the free
and unUmi ted coinage of 11lver and gold at ... ratio of 16 to 1.
The success of the Populists in the congressional elections of 1894
made it impossible for the Democratio and Republican Parties to ignore the
10 DaTil Rich Dnrey, Financial History of the Uni ted :Sta-tes, (American
Citizen Series, Twelfth Edition, ed.1by-xfbert Bus~--Hart, Longmans,
Green and Co., N.Y., 1928), 379.
11 So Ion J. Buck, The Agra~an Crusade, (The Chronioles of America Series,
ed. by .Allen Johiiion, Yale UnIversity 'Press, New Haven. 1921), n.v, 132.

monetary iSlue in the national elections of 1896.

Their

..

choic~ W&.S
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between

winning the South and West with silver and retaining their cOnservative
'VOte with gold.

1'he Rep.1blicans chose the latter course, but -the Democrats,

according to Frederic L. Paxson, were driven toward free silTe~ by "force.
12
beyond the control of [the) politicians."
1'heir ranks in ~. South and
West had for some time been penneated by the Populist doctrine of tree
lilver, and the repeal of the silver clause of the Sherman Act at a time
when money was particularly scarce in those regiona drove men .ho had
fought the Populist doctrine lince 1890 to its support.

The Oemocra.tic

conventions of thirty states instructed their delegates to the national
convention in Chicago, July 7, to demand free silver.

Thil gl"oUp obtained

control of the convention on the first ballot, decided contests in their
Olin

favor, and made s11 ver the chief isaue in their platform.

In William

Jennings Bryan, a young Nebraska la-wyer, who, since 1890, had been an advooate of bimetallism, they found their candidate.

When the

in st. Louis, July 22, i 't was logical that they should
tuBe with the Democrats.

~puli8ta

endors~

met

Bryan and

This action proved to be the death bleH of the

Populist Party but not of the farmer'. devotion to inflation "'hen hia
next crisia came in the 1920's.
In the meantime, what its indu8trial and governmental Ipon.or. intended
f

to be a form of controlled inflation was enacted into law. · 'he panic of
12 Frederic L. Paxson, The New Nation, (Riverside History of the United
States, ed .. by WilliuE7'1Ji:,dd, Houghton Mifflin Co., N:I.:-f924)
IV, 2!6.

r
..

63

1907 produoed investigationa and studies whioh it wa. hoped would 101ve the

periodic problem of monetary stringenoy.

'!hey in turn produced the 'edera.1

Resern System. .1s Originally conceived. thia Iystem was intended as a
means of expanding ourrenoy when bus in... condi tiona r.quir.d it and
contracting the oirculating medium when the need was le...

But the Federal

Reserve Aot had barely beoome .effeotive wh.n World War I broke out and an
amendment whioh permitted relerve banks to loan to member bank. on government seourities diverted the faoilitiel of the Iystem to the financing of
American partioipation in the war.

»111 provided the basi. for war time

inflation With the dire reBulta for far.merl which were d.soribed in
Chapter One.
Suggestions for monetary inflation oame from varioul lources during
11
the '20'1.
But, of courae. rural l.aders were once more the prinoipal
proponents of .xpanaion.

It was during thia period that proposal. to

stabilize the purchasing power of the dollar were fir8t .eriou.ly oonsidered as a method of oontrol1ed inflation.

In 1922. the national .1gri-

cul tural Conferenoe oalled by Prealdent Coolidge recommended inftstigation
of plan. to that .nd, and, in 1926. the Hou8e Committee on Banking and
Curr.noy b.gan hearings on monetary stabilization of that Dature and
14
continued them through .evera1 les8iona of Congr....
13

14

For .xamp1e t Thomal Edison propo.ed the. t the government sponsor a
oommodity dollar based on warehoused farm producta. Sparks, 353.
Gee, 29, Crawford, 14.

r
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Agitation tor currency expansion reaohed a cre.cendo
preuionot the '30'1.

durin~

...

the de-

Lindley notes that -many insurance company

exeoutives and businels men, who were molt dependent on the tanaer's
ability to buy and sustain hil debts,· joined tarm and silTer-state leaders
15
in the ti£ht tor an augmented medium ot exchange.
George Soule states
that he reoeiTed literally thousands ot inflation lohemes during 1931 and
1932--scheme8 tor remonetizing silver, issuing greenbacks, devaluing gold,
ilsuing bonds as legal tender, issuing stamped script, abandoning a metallic
standard altogether and basing currenoy on ordinary oommodities and

10

16

on.

li>re than titty bills embodying suoh proposals were ottered to the
72nd Congress.

The conservative HOOTer

A~nistration

blocked the more

radical measures but two · inflationary laws were enacted.

~e

tirst, the

Glass-Steagall Act ot February 27, 1932, was sponsored by the adminis17
tration;
the seoond, the Borah-GlallJ AmeBdment to the Home Loan Bank:
Act, was simply more aooeptable to the HooTeri tes than the Goldsborough
Prioe Stabilization Bill.
The Glall Steagall Act perm! tted a substitution ot government aecurities tor the gold, OTer and aboTe the 40 peroent required by law,
which had been baoking tederal relerve notes beoause there wal a dearth

ot eligible paper.

It was estimated that thil would result in an expansion

15 Lindley, 114.
16 Soule, 189.

17

It was not put torward as an intlationary measure but inflationary
po 8 sibi 11 ti e8 b rough t su pport to it. Crawto rd, 17.

,.....
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of currenoy by a maximum of about $1,500,000,000. 18
'!he Goldsborough Bill proposed unabashed currenoy management.

It

would have had the government re.tore and maintain, by control of oredit
and ourrenoy, the average purohasing power of the dollar as shown in the
wholesale oommodity markets for the period 1921 to 1929.

'!he value of the

dollar in thoae years was to be asoertained by the 1Department of Labor, and
the Federal Reserve System, through the open-market purohase and sale of
government seouri ties and the control
stabilize its value.

0

f disoount rates, was to resto re and

'!he federal reserve bank. had exeroised such powers

previously but With emphasis on needs of business ~ not wi th the prioe
level as prime oonsideration.

19

A, has been noted, the Borah-Glass Amendment replaoed thi' bill.

amen&nent increased the number

~f

Thi'

national bank notes in oirculation by

about $920,000,000 through the expedienoy of permitting notes to be secured
by all bonds of the United States Government bearing interest at 3 3/8
percent or less.

Previously, this privilege had been confined to three

issues of 2 peroent bonds aggregating .675,900,000.

20

Obviously, the existenoe of pre-"New Deal" inflation sentiment is
inoontestable--is, in fact

80

well established that its persistenoe over

the year. would, in all probability, never be ohallenged.
18 Ibid.
19 ~., 15

20 Ibid.

Consequently,

r--

--------------------------------------------------------------------~

the real question in assesling the charaoter of thil pha.e ot the
Deal" ilt
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.."N8W

were tlNew Deal" methods of intlation the traditional one.?

Or,

at least, had they been advooated earlier?
When the Thomas Amendment was reoeiving oonsideration in the Senate,
the orthodoxy ot seotions 1 and 2 was defended by Senator Rankin.

These

were the leotions dealing With Federal Reserve market operations and the
possible issue of United States notes, respeotively.
that money issued under seotion 1

ft.

Senator Rankin stated

in acoordanoe with the Federal Reserve

Aot and would be on a pari ty with money issued under the Federal Reserve
System, while money ciroulated under section 2 would be issued under the
21
same law employed by Abraham Linooln during the Civil War.
It 11 true
~

that federal re.. rve banks were authorized to deal in government seouritie ••
It ia al.o true that a huge experiment With thil torm of inflation was
oarried on under Pre.ident Hoover.

During hi. adminiltration,

fed~ral

reserve banks aooumulated about $500,000,000 of exoe •• reserTes, on whiCh

to extend oredi t, through the purohaae

0" gOVftl"l:UlleD.t bonds.23

A. for the

Un! ted states notes, the so-oalled greenbaokl, we have already stated that

their further contraction was blocked in 1868.

They still formed a part

ot the national currenoy in 1933.
Probably the most oontroversy has centered around the president·.
power to reduoe the gold oontent of the dollar.

But onoe more evidenoe

21 Congressional Reoord, 73d Cong., 1st Seas., 2174.
22 38 Stat. L., 266.
23

---

Lindley, 122) Soule, 180.

~-----------,
67

.

forces us to conclude that the "New meal" did not pioneer in untried fields.
We may go back as far as 1834 for the first example of suoh aotion.

In an

attempt to keep undervalued silver ooins in oirculation. the gold content of
24
the dollar was reduced slightly in June of that year.
This was a single
drastic procedure tocorrect a single situation, nevertheless, it set a
preoedent.
Furthermore, for nearly twenty years prior to the "New Deal." through
the efforts of a group of prominent economists, minds were being oonditioned
to the idea of changing the weight of the gold dollar to control price
levels.

As early as 1912, one of this group of speoialists, Professor

Irving Fisher of Yale, developed the theory of the commodity, sometimes
called the oompensated, dollar.

Mr. Fisher, at that time, proposed that

the gold dollar cease to be a constant weight of gold with a variable purchasing power; instead, he suggested, that it be a gold dollar of constant
purohasing power and varying weight.

That would mean to "virtually"

inorease or decrease the weight of the gold dollar to compensate tor the
depreciation or appreciation of gold • . 'n'le use of the word "virtually"
here means the gold would not actually be ooined.

It WOuld, rather, be

kept in bullion form in the Un! ted States Treasury and certificates baaed
on it would be circulated.

Tb round out his plan, Mr. Fisher advocated

a change in the status of gold coins already minted to that of silver coins.
ihat is, they would be mere tokens entitling the holder to a varying
24 Dewey, 211.

quanti ty of gold bUll. ion Which would be the virtual dollar.
be Wise to restore the ancient custom of seigniorage

25
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Also. it would

adjusted aocording

to index numbers and to lower or raise 'the mint-prioe of gold to keep pace
1ft th its depreciatiOIJ. or appreoiation.

The adjustment of weight would have

to take plaoe monthlY" or quarterly and be determined by an official index
utullber of prioes to be based on the prioes of some initial year.

26

There is DDloh e..,1denoe to show that this theory was "taking hold"
dUring the 1920t a and the years of the depression.

'lb.e deliberations of
27
the House ColDIlli tte" on Banking and Currenoy have been mentioned.
Gee

Says -that Henry A. wallace while .till -editor of Wallaoe'. Farmer was an
28
euthuliastio ohampion of the idea.
I~ received attention in auch pub29

11oations as Elementary Eoonomios. I. by Fairohild. Furniss and Buok
and was endorsed in articles whioh appeared in the Annals ~~Amerioan

-

26 This was a small oharge for ooinage.

Mr. Fisher intended it to restriot
the amount of gold oOined. thereby reduoing prioes. This effeot. of
course, would be the direot opposite of the purpose for which Mr.
Roosevelt eventually used his power to reyalue the dollar, but that does
not undermine tpe contention that Fisherts plan helped prepare the way
for the reception of revaluation.

26 Irving Fisher, ~A Com~enBated Ebllar", (The guarterly Journal ~
Eoonomics, Harvard Un1versity, Cambridge, Mass., 1913, XivI, 213-235),
233-235, passim.
27

28

See p. 63.
~.

!!!..,

29
. Jilcmillan,

105.

1931, 551-532.

~oademy ~

Politioal and Sooial Soience

~Harpert ••

30

..
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Mr. O'Neal,

President of the .Amerioan Farm Bureau, to Id the House Committee on
Agrioulture~

in Deoember of 1932, that a oonterenoe of agrioultural organ-

izations had agreed definitely on a program oalling for reduotion of the
amount of gold in the dollar by about 30 percent.

31

In the meantime, the name of Professor George F. Warren of Cornell
University oame to be identified most 0108e1y with the oommodity dollar.
Gee 8ays he was ·perhaps, the most influential single advoo.te of the
idea."32

And, indeed, all literature on the subject so oonsistently

mention8 Professor Warren' 8 name together With that of his colleagu\!t,
Professor Frank A. Pearson, that one most conclude that he did not a little
of the spade work neoessary to plant the
Amerioan oonsoiousness:.

By

1933" , ~

oom,~ated

dollar theory in the

the two profe8sor8 were ready to publish

a detailed study of' prioes, whioh was obviously, the result of long and
painstaking labor.

It oontained an apologia for the oommodity dollar and

30 Dr. W.T. FOlter, "Planning in a Free Country, JIlnaged Money and Unmanaged ),{an", .Annals of the Amerioan Aoademy of Poli tioa1 and Sooia1
Scienoe, vol. 162, Philadelphia, July, 1932, 19-57; Stuart-chase, "1he
Case for Inflation", Harper' 8, va 1. 165~ Harper and Brothers, N.Y.,
June, 1932, 198-207.
31

32

Chamberlain~ 255, oiting Hearing before House Committee on Agriou1ture
on H.R. 13991, 72d Cong., 2nd Sess., Deoember 13-20, 193~

-.2E..

~., 105.
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endorsed and acknowledged Professor Fisher's pioneering efforts "to
33
establish a scientific measure of value."
The silver provision in the Amendment was. as Lindley say', "encrusted
with a rare assortment of economio theories of venerable history which
were kept alive by the demand of the silver-mining states ••• ,,34

M>ley

informs us that the manner ot its implementation had been a apet idea" of
Senator Key Pi tmann' s. one ot the men who had long fought for silver.
Lindley's statement

wall

not an exaggeration.

35

In the early days of the

republic, while we had a bimetallic standard, silver had been accepted in
payment of both public and private debts, from both foreign and domestic
36
debtors.
After ita demonetization in 1813, the silver interests with the
aid ot the farmers and some laboring group. had twioe succeeded in having
laws passed authorizing its purchase and coinage by t.'le govertlment.

Both

these laws, the Bland-Allison Act of 1818 and the Sherman Silver PUrchase
Aot of 1890, provided iilat silver certificates be :l.s8ued against the
. d • 31
s i1 ver th us acqul.re

33 George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson, Prices, John Wiley and Sons,
N.Y., 1933.
34 Op.

~.,

123.

£E..

i
~.,

160.

35

36 Ernest Ludlow Bogart, Economic History of the Amerioan People. Longmans,
Green and Co., N.Y., 1932, 368.
-31 !£~. ~., 25; 26~. ~., 289.

..
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No exaot precedent 'eem., to exist for the pro~.ion giving the
president power to fix the ratio between silver and gold, but one in "the
same Ipirit does.

'!he Bland-Allison Act directed Preddent Hayes to

negotiate, through cOmmil8ioners, with Latin American and European
countries to the end that a CODmon ratio:-. betwoen gold and silver be
adopted internationally.

38

As a last pOint, we may consider what was, in reality, the lalient
aohievement of the Thomas Amendment--the weakening of the lacrOlanot
gold standard.

Here, again, it il correot to say that the "Hew Deal"

limply followed a trend for the fir.t great rift in the gold atandard
had come some years before.

At the end of World War I, it had been

necessary to establish new currencies for the countries created by the
diplomats, with the oonsequenoe, that existing gold supplies "had ~
lupport a DDlch larger superstruoture ctpaper ourrenoy" than in the
.~ bellum period.

This situation 'Was met by the creation of the "gold

exchange standard and by placing gold movementl on a bullion basiS."
These de~oes enabled most of the new countries of oentral Europe to use
"paper exchange on straight gold standard countries" 11ke our own.

'!here-

after, the relation was not the simple one of gold to paper, rather, it
was "paper to paper to gold."

39

This is a subtle distinction, but one

Which cannot be overlooked in this diSCUSSion, for it indicates
38 Ibid.

39 Beard and Smith, 26, 27.

th~t

the
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inviolable oharacter of the gold standard had oeased to exist be.fore the
"New Deal" was conoeived.
It seems, then, that our final judgment in regard to the "New Deal"
inflation polioy must coinoide with our deductions regarding the other
phases of' its agrioul tural program.
novations.

It did not introduoe startling in-

Beard and Smith, in the pentrating .tudy we have several times

quoted, alao adhere to this vi·ewpoint.

In speaking of the monetary leg1l-

lation of the Roosevelt era, they make the following comment:
Entangled in the thought of' the tin:e, apart
from the moneta ry dootrines 0 t traditional inflationists, were the views of politicians Who
were acquainted with the long confli~t in the
Uni ted sta tee over the demand to r a oomplete
transfer of oontrol over banks of issue from
pri "fate hands to the Federal Government and the
newer views respeoting government management ot
currenoy •••• How far these two types of views
actually influenced the Ie gislation ••• i t is now
HlpolJ8ible to discover.... That they were present
in the struggle oannot be dlltbted. 40

40 ~., 122.

•
. CONCLUSION
Formal conclusions in regard to specifio

fa~

policies and the phases

of the "New Deal" program of which they formed a part have been stated.
a general deduction is of the essence of such a discussion.
not difficult for "New Deal"

fa~

But

To draw one is

policies were the crest of a long and

consistent rural movement.
Tradi tionally, rural America has looked upon the use of the powers of
government as a normal means of securing agrioultural welfare.

With per-

Sistence, the farmer has solicited state and federal help to resolve his
difficul ties and government has responded with a slow but steady increase of
interest in the economic life of the farm.

Of its very nature, lIuch an

interest generated a tendency toward cooperation:

in the earlier, timid

years, cooperation between farmers sponsored by the government; in
oooperation between farm groups and the government i tsel!.

tin~,

a

'!b.e "New Deal"

took this hesitant yearning and with swift boldness developed it into a
doctrine of government responsibility.

Then, true to itself, it put into

effect, for the liard pressed farmers of the time, programs and visions
culled from the garnered wisdom of the rural past.
1bere was one departure from convention.

Fresh, vivid, bo ld, and con-

fident language clothed the old stratagems in ooncealing habiliments.
paraphrase the words of Isaac of old:
but the voice was the voice of

J~oob.

13

To

The hands were the hands of Esau,

..
APPENDIX I
An apparent dilcrepanoy exists between Lindley's acoount of

Rooeevelt"

adoption of the allotment ,plan and that of George Soule in his

volume, :!!:.!,' Coming Amerioan Revolution.

A

letter

_8

addressed to Rexford

Tugwell asking him to verify or deny Mr. Lindley's statements.

Mr Tugwell

replied as follows:

THE UUVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Chioago 37, Illinois

Department of Sooiology
. 17 July 1947

Sister Mary Ritella, E.V.M.
'lhe Immaoula ta
Chicago l~, Illinois
Dear Sister *rys
Your ditf'icul ty is understandable.
I think: what Mr. George soule meant was that the ....e11known fundamental work of W. J. Spillman in the Department of Agriculture laid the indispensable basis what [sic]
later became the allotment plan for agrioul ture. But,
what Mr. Lindley said is also true.
Perhaps if you wish to follow the
matter further, we migpt talk about it sometime in the
Fall.

Sinoerely yours,
Rexford G. Tugwell
RGTt ry
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APFENDIX II
TABLE SHOWING THERATIO OF FARM PROOOCT PRICES
TO TAX AND INTEREST PAYMENTS

year

Index Numbers of Tax and Interest
Payment

Total Farm Tax and Interest
Payment (~llions)

100

.755
.1,457
.1,684
.1,749

1914
1920
1921
1922

1

193
223
232
Ratio of Prioes of Farm Products
to Tax and Interest Payments

Index Numbers of Pri ces of Farm
Products

100
201

100
104

114

66

12Z:

53

In his annual report for the year 1932, the Seoretary of Agri'-oulture
stated that the farmer's cash inoome showed no increase in the period 1923 "
tol~29,

rather, it fell off 35 percent as compared with 1919 while his
2

tax burden and indebtedness mounted substantially.

1 Yearbook ot Uni ted States Department of Agrioul ture, 1923, ,8.
2

-

JIluri tz A. Hallgren, Seeds of Revolt, A Study of .Amerioan Life and the
Temper £!. the Amerioan PeopIi ~ring the Depreuion, Altred"""i':' Knopr,N. Y., 1932:--23, oi ting statistical Abstract, 649 and Annual Report ot
~ Seoretary 2!.. Agrioul ture, October 31, 1932.
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